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Abstract. This paper examines the effect of monetary policy on bank credit in Uganda 
during the January 2008 to December 2017 period. By using macro level monthly data, it 
tests for the existence of monetary policy transmission channels, in particular the presence 
of bank credit channel in the economy of Uganda. This is done by showing that bank credit 
growth in Uganda is affected by monetary policy shocks. Before conducting data analysis, 
tight bank credit models were built with the view of making the analysis mimic the actual 
behavior of bank credit and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Data used in the 
empirical analysis are from Bank of Uganda. Empirical analysis is conducted by using the 
generalized least squares (GLS) technique. The advantage with the GLS method is that it is 
generally more efficient because it eliminates both serial correlation and variance values 
that are not constant. The empirical results establish presence of the bank credit channel of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Uganda. Secondly, the empirical tests 
conducted establish that the relationship between reserves and loans typically operates in 
the reverse way to that described in some economics textbooks. Similarly, the relationship 
between bank deposits and bank deposits is found in principle to operate only during the 
current month in the reverse way to that described in some economics textbooks. Thirdly, 
empirical tests conducted indicate that 1 percent increase in money supply (M2) is 
responsible for causing 2.2 percent monthly increase in bank deposits in Uganda during the 
sample period, ceteris paribus. 
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1. Introduction 
he major objective of the study is to empirically examine the effect of 
monetary policy on bank credit in Uganda. There is widespread 
agreement on the key roles that banks play in the transmission of 
monetary policy initiatives to the economy. But there is considerable 
controversy over the precise roles that banks play. The paper focuses on 
examining whether bank credit (i.e. lending) played a special part in the 
monetary transmission mechanism particularly in Uganda during the 
2008:1 to 2017:12 period. As a result the major research question of the 
paper is: Do monetary policy changes directly constrain bank credit? The 
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existence of lending or credit channels influence the willingness and ability 
of banks to extend credit as well as the aggregate economic activities.  
There are two channels within the credit channel that act as conduits of 
the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policies: (a) the balance 
sheet channel or the borrower’s net worth channel and (b) the bank lending 
channel. The balance sheet channel is the channel through which policy can 
weaken the balance sheet of borrowers and affect their borrowing capacity. 
The bank lending channel occurs when tight monetary policy or an increase 
in the issuance of commercial papers by firms is shown to be related to a 
decrease in loan supply rather than a decline in loan demand. Therefore, 
the bank lending channel can only be possible under two conditions: if 
there are borrowers who are dependent on banks for their loan 
requirements and if the loan supply of these banks are affected by 
movements in monetary policy (Aban, 2013). 
A conducive monetary policy is required for bank credit to play 
important roles in the monetary transmission mechanism. But there is 
conflicting evidence on how bank lending is directly constrained by 
monetary policy actions (Morris & Sellon, 1995). Therefore, the paper 
attempts to determine whether bank credit is indeed constrained by 
monetary policy. 
Monetary policy is any policy measure designed by the Government or 
the Central Bank to control the cost, availability and supply of credit (Dare 
& Okeya, 2017). The major goals of monetary policy are mainly to control 
(a) inflation and (b) maintain a healthy balance of payment (BOP) position, 
in order to safeguard the external value of national currency and promote 
adequate and sustainable level of economic growth and development. The 
monetary (regulatory) authorities achieve these goals through control of 
money supply to enhance price stability (i.e. low and stable inflation). The 
Ministry of Finance is responsible for monetary management functions, 
whereas the central bank is responsible for its function of decision making 
on the monetary policy. As a result these responsibilities make the process 
of monitoring monetary policy a seemingly difficult task (Osiegbu, 2006). 
Opolot & Nampewo (2014) by using pane data examines the relevance 
of the bank lending channel of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Uganda by using micro–level data. His study focuses on the 
response of bank loans to the following variables: GDP, 91–day–treasury 
bill rate, inflation, liquidity and capitalization only. As a result, by using 
the generalized least squares technique, this paper examines the response 
of bank credit to GDP, inflation and liquidity (M2) including those 
variables that Opolot & Nampewo (2014) ignored: bank deposits, velocity 
of credit, velocity of money, real interest rate, exchange rate, net equity, 
currency in circulation, total deposits in the banking system, government 
bonds, demand deposits, external debt servicing, exports and imports. 
More importantly, the paper rejects the empirical evidence by Werner 
(2014) regarding the three theories of banking. He claims that it is the one 
that is being belittled in the literature today as having the least influence 
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that is being supported by the empirical evidence. The three theories that 
Werner (2014) identify are: (a) The financial intermediation theory of 
banking which states that banks are merely intermediaries like other non–
bank financial institutions, collecting deposits that are then lent out. (b) The 
fractional reserve theory of banking which claims that individual banks are 
mere financial intermediaries that cannot create money, but collectively 
they end up creating money through systemic interaction. (c) The credit 
creation theory of banking maintains that each individual bank has the 
power to create money out of nothing and does so when it extends credit. 
Although Werner (2014) uses the balances sheet method, this paper 
employs the generalized least squares (GLS) technique and empirically 
rejects the notion that banks individually create money out of nothing. 
Implying that systemic issues emanating from the banking sector are 
possible to detect (a) in economic models that include banks and (b) in 
finance models that are based on individual, representative financial 
institutions that can be embed these appropriately into macroeconomic 
models contrary to what King (1994) King (1994) and Werner (2014) 
suggested. 
 
2. Literature review 
Contemporary economists evaluate monetary policy by examining 
monetary policy shocks represented by changes in nominal interest rates 
rather than changes in the money supply. Therefore, they define monetary 
policy as fixing the nominal interest rate in order to exert influences on 
macroeconomic outcomes such as output and expected inflation while 
allowing the money supply to be determined by interest rate and inflation 
expectations (Kamati, 2014).  
Monetary policy examines issues regarding the effects of monetary 
policy variables on prices and real economic activity. It lies at the heart of 
macroeconomic theory and at the center of monetary policy. Economists 
generally agreed that monetary policy, specifically unanticipated monetary 
shocks, have a significant effect on the economy, even if it is at least in the 
short run. Changes in monetary policy variables are relayed throughout the 
economy via a transmission mechanism, commonly known as the 
monetary transmission mechanism (Robinson & Robinson, 1997). 
Monetary policy transmission mechanism takes place largely through its 
influence on aggregate demand in the economy. In the long run, monetary 
policy determines the nominal or money values of goods and services i.e. 
the general price level. In other words, in the long run, monetary policy 
essentially determines the value of money i.e. movements in the general 
price level indicate how much the purchasing power of money has to 
change over time. Thus, inflation is regarded as a monetary phenomenon 
and there are several channels in the chain of causation running from 
monetary policy changes to their ultimate effects on the economy (Bank of 
England, 1999). 
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A central bank has the monopoly power to supply base money. It does 
so in order to determine a specific interest rate in the wholesale money 
markets. The operating procedure of a central bank  is similar to that of 
many other central banks. But institutional details differ slightly from 
country to country. Thus, the central bank chooses the price at which it will 
lend high–powered (base) money to private sector institutions.  
In many countries the central bank lends predominantly through sale 
and repurchase agreements (repo) at the two–week maturity and repo rate 
is the official rate. Change in the official rate has quantitative effect on 
movements of other interest rates. As a result effects of official rate on 
financial markets in general, will depend on the extent to which the policy 
change was anticipated and how the change affects expectations of future 
policy (Bank of England, 1999). 
 
2.1. The three major theories of monetary policy 
The Keynesian theory of monetary policy focuses on the liquidity 
preference theory. That is the Keynesian demand for money introduced in 
the monetary sector (Belke & Polleit, 2009). The liquidity preference theory 
is one of important features that distinguish Keynesian monetary theory 
from the general family of neoclassical theories. The Keynesian liquidity 
preference theory explains why people individually express demands for 
money; the motives for money as liquid asset (Lewis & Mizen, 2000). In the 
Keynesian theory of economics, the demand for money is determined by 
interactions between income and interest rate, that is, the price of demand.  
As a result, the Keynesians argued that, to influence the demand for 
money, there should be direct control of either the price of money or 
indirect control by inducing changes through real income. In brief, the 
theory holds that a change in interest rate, other things being equal, affects 
individual preferences for holding liquid (cash) and illiquid assets (Akani 
& Imegi, 2017). 
According to Cagan (1989), monetarism as a theory is associated with 
the view that (a) the quantity of money affects economic activity and price 
level, and (b) inflation can be controlled by a monetary policy that targets 
the growth of money supply. As a school of thought monetary theory has 
been spearheaded by Friedman & Schwartz (1982). Monetarists emphasize 
the role of money and the link between money growth and inflation (De 
Long, 2000).  
The Monetarists describe the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
as a direct relationship between money and inflation as depicted in the 
quantity equation theory of money. This direct relationship is opposed to 
indirect link through financial markets as described in the Keynesian 
monetary theory. Friedman (1968) is viewed to be the father of monetarism 
and he asserts that there is clear evidences that monetary policy strongly 
affects the real variables in the short term  (Akani & Imegi, 2017). 
But rational expectations theory was formulated by Muth (1961). Muth 
(1961) states that the players in an economy will act in a way that conforms 
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to what can logically be expected in the future. That is, a person will invest 
or spend according to what he rationally believes will happen in the future. 
There are two broad channels through which the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism operates: (a) credit channel and (b) assets price 
channel. The credit channel consists of (i) bank lending channel, (ii) balance 
sheet channel which also includes the cash flow channel and unanticipated 
price level channel (iii) expectations channel and (iv) household liquidity 
effects channel. The assets price channel consists of (i) interest rate channel, 
(ii) exchange rate channel, (iii) equity prices channel and (iv) wealth effects 
channel (Chileshe, 2017; Mishkin, 2004, p.619). 
 
2.2. Theory of monetary policy transmission mechanism and bank 
credit channel 
Monetary policy aims at controlling aggregate demand by directly 
controlling the money supply or by altering the rate of interest and backing 
this up by making any other necessary changes (Sloman & Wride, 2009). In 
general, monetary policy refers to any deliberate action by the central bank 
designed to change the availability or cost of money (Stanlake, 1974). 
Monetary policy can be referred to as either being expansionary, if it 
increases the money supply and lowers the rate of interest. The monetary 
policy can be referred to as contractionary, if it reduces the money supply 
and increases the rate of interest (Kalikeka & Sheefeni, 2013). 
A correct assessment of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is 
vital for understanding and foreseeing the effects of the monetary 
conditions on the real economy (Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007). As a result, the 
mechanism through which the monetary policy is transmitted to the real 
economy has been the topic of extensive theoretical and empirical research. 
Yet, the exact mechanism has not yet been completely unveiled, a situation 
which Barnanke & Gertter (1995) describe as a black box (Barnanke & 
Gertter, 1995; Oni & Ozemhoka, 2013). The macroeconomic response to 
policy–induced interest rate changes was considerably larger than implied 
by conventional estimates of interest elasticity’s of consumption and 
investment. Thus, implying that mechanisms other than the interest rate 
channel were at work in the transmission of monetary policy (Barnanke & 
Gertter, 1995). 
The monetary transmission mechanism looks at how a change in the 
money supply is channeled through particular models to influence real and 
nominal variables. Classical economists use the quantity theory to give a 
direct and mechanical link between money and prices. But the Keynesian 
economists put emphasis on the indirect mechanism through which money 
affects the price level via the interest rate (Akani & Imegi, 2017; Dennis, 
1981; Oni & Ozemhoka, 2013). In using monetary policy, the central bank 
can push up market interest rates by reducing the supply of money. The 
central bank can sell government securities to the public in exchange for 
checks drawn on commercial banks in the economy. When the central bank 
debits the reserve accounts of the commercial banks, reserves in the 
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banking system fall relative to deposits (Morgan, 1992). Bank credit 
creation can be affected by monetary policy through two closely related 
sub–channels: bank balance sheet channels and the bank lending channels 
(Oni & Ozemhoka, 2013).  
The traditional transmission model rules out (a) the existence of the 
financial sector and every profitable project at the prevailing interest rate 
according to Modigliani & Miller (1958), and (b) argues that the source of 
financing does not matter for the firm to make its (investment) decisions 
and that resources are always allocated efficiently.  
As a result, in the context of symmetrical information and no transaction 
costs, financial intermediation serves no purpose and thus no resources are 
devoted to it. Therefore, the traditional transmission model, takes financial 
intermediaries particularly banks to exist as the economy’s efficient 
response to information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, its 
associated transaction and monitoring costs, and the presence of liquidity 
risks.  
The traditional transmission model (TTM) also treats the financial 
intermediaries as if they exist in a world with multiple financial 
instruments; where at least two sources of financing must be recognized for 
firms.  
Firstly, the external or intermediated funds is where the firms can access 
the financial market, but does not trade directly with individual investors, 
and they receive their funds through an intermediary (bank loans). 
Secondly, the TTM considers sources internal/direct funds, in which the 
firm can (a) either finances itself, without accessing the financial market, (b) 
or is able to raise fund directly from individual investors (through the issue 
of bonds or stocks). The implicit assumption in the traditional monetary 
transmission mechanism is problematic for the second source, because it 
can be restricted (totally or partially) for a significant number of firms. If so, 
the fall in investment may not depend, as in the traditional channel, on the 
project’s profitability relative to its alternative costs but rather on the firm’s 
access to bank credit.  
Two major mechanisms have been proposed to explain the link between 
monetary policy actions and the cost, namely the balance sheet channel and 
the bank lending channel. This tries to separate the effects on the firms’ 
borrowing capacity from the amount of credit offered by the banks. Both 
rely on a market imperfection, which conditions access to the financial 
market on the firm‘s characteristics, rather than on the profitability of its 
investment projects (Gerlach & Peng, 2005; Akani & Imegi, 2017). 
2.2.1. The balance sheet channel 
The credit channel of monetary policy consists of the bank lending 
channel, balance sheet channel, expectations channel and household 
liquidity effects channel. The bank lending channel operates on the banks’ 
liability side. Tight monetary policy can drain reserves from the banking 
system. As a result, the banks are left with fewer loanable funds, thus 
causing reduction in lending (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988).  
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The balance sheet channel operates through banks’ asset side. Through 
the balance sheet channel, monetary policy affects agency costs in bank 
lending, which leads to changes in firms’ ability to qualify for credit. 
Monetary contractions reduce the net worth of borrowers, and 
consequently increases agency costs, primarily for low–net–worth firms 
(Bernanke et al., 1996; Black & Rosen, 2016). As a result, increase in agency 
costs cause only relatively safer borrowers to continue qualifying for credit 
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1989). 
Monetary policy models describe an economy in which there is an 
excess supply. It assumes the aggregate output to be demand determined 
in the short to medium run. Agents in this macro model consists of (a) 
households, (b) domestic firms, (c) the government; (d) the rest of the 
world who provides capital, goods and services demanded by the domestic 
economy and a market for domestic production and (e) the central bank. 
Furthermore, in the model, the central bank has the task of anchoring the 
nominal side of the economy. Consequently, to provide nominal stability in 
the economy, the central bank adopts an inflation targeting framework (IT). 
The IT is a flexible inflation targeting and the central bank sets a short–term 
interest rate to achieve an inflation target.  
The monetary policy model assumes that there are lags and delays 
between a change in interest rate and inflation. Therefore, the use of a 
simple interest rate rule is required to anchor inflation in the long run, 
given these lags and price and wage rigidities, Moreover, the nominal 
short–term interest rates play leading role as instruments of monetary 
policy.  
The monetary policy model takes the transmission mechanism to begin 
with the domestic interest rate policy (Clarida, Gali & Gertler, 2000). Cash 
flow channel is another balance sheet channel. It operates through its effects 
on cash flow, the difference between cash receipts and cash expenditures. 
Improvement in the balance sheets of firms can occur when expansionary 
monetary policy lowers nominal interest rates and raises cash flow. 
Increase in cash flow leads to improvement in the balance sheet because it 
increases the liquidity of the firm (or household) and thus makes it easier 
for lenders to know whether the firm (or household) will be able to pay its 
bills. Unanticipated price level channel is a third balance sheet channel. It 
operates through monetary policy effects on the general price level. 
Unanticipated rise in the price level lowers the value of firms’ liabilities in 
real terms (decreases the burden of the debt) but does not lower the real 
value of the firms’ assets (Mishkin, 2004, pp.622–623). 
2.2.2. The bank lending channel 
According to King (1991) the bank lending channel represents the credit 
view of this mechanism. According to this view, monetary policy works by 
affecting bank assets (loans i.e. credit) as well as banks’ liabilities (deposits). 
More importantly, King (1991) contends that monetary policy besides 
shifting the supply of deposits also shifts the supply of bank loans. For 
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instance, an expansionary monetary policy that increases bank reserves and 
bank deposits increase the quantity of bank loans available. As a result, due 
to many borrowers who are dependent on bank loans to finance their 
activities, bank loans will increase and cause a rise in investment spending 
(and also consumer spending), leading ultimately to an increase in 
aggregate output (𝑌).  
King (1994) provides a schematic presentation of the resulting monetary 
policy effects as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑛 ↑→ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 ↑→ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 ↑→ 𝐼 ↑→ 𝑌 ↑ 
 
The scheme provided by King (1994) appears to be wrong because it is 
not in line with the scheme advanced by Stroup (2006, pp.184–224) as 
follows: 
     𝐶𝑟 = 𝐷 − 𝐵𝐷 
                   𝐶𝑟 = (𝑚𝑀𝑛/𝑟𝑚) − 𝐵𝐷 
 
Thus, implying that 
 
𝑀𝑛 ↑→ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 ↑→ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 ↓→ 𝐼 ↓→ 𝑌 ↓ 
 
Where 𝑀𝑛 is money supply, 𝐶𝑟 is bank credit (bank lending), 𝐷 is total 
deposits in the banking system, 𝑚 is the money multiplier and 𝑟𝑚 is deposit 
multiplier. Therefore, the two schemes have to be evaluated for their 
correctness. 
According to Tabak et al. (2016), the global banking crisis which started 
in 2007, prompted more debate about the role of banks in the monetary 
policy transmission process. As a result, the bank credit has received much 
attention from researchers as a channel for monetary policy transmission. 
Considering the fact that monetary policy directly affects bank deposits is 
important because deposits represent the supply of loan funds, which act 
as a driving force for credit. In the monetary policy transmission process, a 
restrictive monetary policy reduces the number of deposits in the banking 
system leading to a decline in loans. This happens when banks realize that 
the payments of credits already granted will not be sufficient to restore the 
reduction of deposits based on a possible increase in defaults. As a result, 
the banks increase interest rates on new loans due to a decline in the supply 
of credit (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988; Tabak et al., 2016). 
Again, according to Tabak et al. (2016), two traditional channels of 
monetary policy transmission mechanism exist. These two channels can 
explain the association between monetary policy and the evolution of the 
balances of bank deposits. Through these channels, the central bank can 
either (a) change the level of deposits by controlling of bank reserves and 
by manipulation of the money multiplier (Disyatat, 2010) or (b) making the 
bank lending channel possible through the influence of monetary policy on 
the soundness of bank balance sheets (Tabak et al., 2016). Experiences from 
many central banks around the world has shown that there has been a shift 
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from the traditional interest rate targeting approach to monetary policy 
technique (Serletis et al., 2013). The monetary policy approach focuses 
mainly on the central bank and its balance sheet. Central banks have 
decided to use quantitative measures of monetary policy such as 
quantitative easing and credit easing (Tabak et al., 2016). 
Spahn (2014) contends that although the doctrine of deposits availability 
appears flawed it is still accepted in the circle of central banks. According 
to the European Central Bank (2010a, p.63), bank lending tends to contract 
after a tightening in monetary policy. As a result an increase in the policy 
rate causes a reduction in the availability of bank deposits. Thus deposit 
holders shift their investments from deposits to assets that offer higher 
returns. Banks should compensate for the decline in deposits via other 
sources of funding, because the downward adjustment acts as a constraint 
on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, ultimately inducing a contraction 
in bank loans. On the contrary, the paper discovers that the doctrine of 
deposits availability is not flawed and it was concretely modeled using 
genuine derivations by (Stroup, 2006, pp.184–224). 
But Disyatat (2010) argues that the doctrine of deposits availability 
suffers from a fallacy of composition and stresses that in the system as a 
whole, deposits cannot fall unless banks issue new liabilities to replace 
them or sell an asset to non-banks (including loan repayment). Disyatat 
(2010) thinks that attempts by individual agents to dispose of their deposit 
holdings by buying assets from other nonbank private sector agents simply 
redistributes deposits within the system leaving aggregate deposits 
unchanged. It should be noted that Disyatat (2010) does not distinguish 
between bank deposits and the deposits made by system of banks, but 
Stroup (2006) does. 
2.2.3. The Expectations Channel 
There is a consensus that expectations play a key role in shaping the 
behavior of economic agents as stipulated in modern macroeconomic 
theory. However, economists disagree on how these are generated. 
Friedman and other monetarists, postulate adaptive expectations. On the 
other hand, the new classical school lead by Lucas and the New Keynesian 
School argue for rational expectations. 
The expectation channel is fundamental to the working of all channels of 
monetary policy transmission. That is because economic agents are 
assumed to be forward looking and rational. Although this channel is taken 
to be mainly operational in developed economies with well– functioning 
and deep financial markets (Davoodi et al., 2013) they may be operational 
in less developed economies as well. For example, inflation expectations 
matter in two important ways. Inflation expectations may influence the 
level of the real interest rate and consequently determine the effect of any 
specific nominal interest rate. On the other hand inflation expectations may 
influence price and money wage–setting behavior and get into actual 
inflation in latter periods (Chileshe, 2017). 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
J. Alani, 8(2), 2021, p.94-157 
103 
103 
2.2.4. Household Liquidity Effects 
The credit channel applies equally well to consumer spending, 
particularly on consumer durables and housing. That is because declines in 
bank lending induced by a monetary contraction may cause a decline in 
durables and housing purchases by consumers who do not have access to 
other sources of credit. Furthermore, the consumers’ cash flow is adversely 
affected due to increases in interest rates by causing a deterioration in 
household balance sheets. In the liquidity effects channel, balance sheet 
effects work through their impact on consumers’ desire to spend rather 
than on lenders’ desire to lend. Consumer durables and housing are very 
illiquid assets due to asymmetric information about their quality. Thus, if 
consumers wanted to sell their consumer durables or housing to raise 
money due to a bad income shock, they would incur a big loss because they 
could not get the full value of these assets in a distress sale (Mishkin, 2004, 
p.264). 
 
2.3. Theory of monetary policy transmission mechanism and bank 
asset price channel 
The monetary policy transmission mechanism involves affects asset 
prices such as bonds, equity and real estate, changing firms’ stock market 
values and household wealth. Movements in stock market values and 
household wealth in turn affect movements in aggregate demand. In the 
asset prices policy mechanism expansionary monetary policy increases the 
demand for equities (either by the Keynesian or by Monetarist argument). 
Thus raising equity prices and thereby boost market value of firms relative 
to the replacement cost of capital, consequently resulting in increased 
investment and as well as output. On the other hand higher equity prices 
raises the net–worth of firms and households. Thus improving their credit 
worthiness and access to funds. These effects would partly be reflected as 
the balance sheet channel of monetary policy (Afandi, 2005). 
In the life cycle model of consumption monetary policy mechanism, 
monetary policy changes affect economic agents’ long-term wealth and 
alters their consumption pattern. As a result consumers smooth out their 
consumption over time and this consumption depends on lifetime 
resources and not only current consumption (Mishkin, 1996). Expansionary 
monetary policy, lowers interest rates and changes consumers’ portfolio 
composition in accordance with the risk of each asset class. Consequently, a 
decrease in the interest rates encourages people to reduce their holding of 
interest earning deposits and bonds and substitute them with 
equity/stocks, thus increasing stock prices (Afandi, 2005; Chileshe, 2017). 
2.3.1. The interest rate channel 
Any change in the short term official rate is quickly transmitted to other 
short term wholesale money–market rates of domestic currency. The 
transmission happens both to money–market instruments of different 
maturity and to other short term rates, such as interbank deposits. On 
changing the official rate (typically on the same day), banks adjust their 
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standard lending rates (base rates),   usually by the exact amount of the 
policy change.  
This change has instantaneous effects on the interest rates that banks 
charge their customers for variable loan rates, including overdrafts. Too, 
rates on standard variable rate of mortgages may be changed as well. 
Likewise, from time to time, rates offered to savers change, in order to 
preserve the margin between deposit and loan rates (Bank of England, 
1999).  
A change in the official rate unambiguously moves other short term 
rates in the same direction and the impact on longer term interest rates can 
go either way. That is because the long term interest rates are affected by an 
average of current and expected future short term rates. Therefore, the 
outcome depends upon the direction and extent of the effect of the official 
rate change on expectations of the future path of interest rates. The actual 
effect on long term rates of an official rate change depend partly on the 
effect of the policy change on inflation expectations (Bank of England, 
1999). 
2.3.2. The exchange rate channel 
The exchange rate channel is one of the primary monetary policy 
transmission channels especially in economies with flexible exchange rate 
regimes. It is through interest rate that monetary policy can influence the 
exchanges (the popular uncovered interest rate parity condition). 
Movements in interest can be altered through direct intervention in foreign 
exchange markets or through inflationary expectations (Dabla–Norris & 
Floerkemeier, 2006).  
In the exchange rate channel, monetary policy affects economic activity 
(e.g. output) through net exports. Expansionary monetary policy, can lead 
to a fall in domestic interest rates relative to the foreign interest rates. Thus, 
inducing capital outflows and leading to a depreciation of the local 
currency. In turn, exports become cheaper, resulting in increased net 
exports and consequently aggregate demand and output (Mishkin, 1996, 
2001). The strength of the exchange rate channel originates from several 
factors such as the exchange rate regime, sensitivity of the interest rates, the 
size and openness of the economy, degree of capital mobility and the 
degree of expenditure switching between domestic and imported goods 
(Boivin et al., 2010; Chileshe, 2017; Boivin et al., 2010; Mishra et al., 2010; 
Tahir, 2012; Chileshe, 2017). 
2.3.3. The equity prices channel 
The price of equity is significantly influenced by a number of factors e.g. 
book value of the firm, dividend per share, earnings per share, price–
earning ratio and dividend cover (Gompers et al., 2003). Equity price is 
determined mostly by basic factors that influence shares: demand and 
supply factors. If most people start buying equity shares then prices move 
up and if people start selling the equity shares then prices go down. 
Government policies as well as performance and potentials that firms and 
industries have, effect demand behavior of investors, both in the primary 
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and secondary markets. Both the macro and micro economic perspectives 
are factors that affect the price of an equity share. Macroeconomic factors 
that influence equity share include politics, general economic conditions. 
That is how the economy is performing, government regulations, and 
etcetera (Shubiri, 2010).  
Stock markets in principle, are expected to accelerate economic growth 
by enhancing domestic savings and increasing the quantity and the quality 
of investment. Stock markets can encourage economic growth particularly 
by providing incentives for growing companies to raise capital at lower 
cost. Moreover, companies in countries with developed stock markets are 
less dependent on bank financing which can provide enough credit. The 
stock market is also expected to perform miracles by permitting long term 
investment.  
Such investments could be financed by funds provided by individuals, 
many of whom wish to make them available for only a very limited period, 
or who wish to be able to withdraw them at will (Baumol, 1965; Shubiri, 
2010). 
2.3.4. Wealth effect channel 
The wealth effect channel has deep roots in the literature on monetary 
policy and economic stabilization. It dates back to at least the earliest 
literature stimulated by Keynes’ General Theory. Changes in consumer 
spending generated by countercyclical changes in the real value of the 
money stock could help provide an automatic stabilizing force to an 
economy subject to inflationary and deflationary forces (Gilbert, 1982; 
Ludvigson et al., 2002). Subsequently, Modigliani (1944, 1963) and Patinkin 
(1965), illustrated the conditions required in the money, goods, and labor 
markets whereby the “real balance effect” could stabilize the economy at 
full employment. Furthermore, Modigliani and collaborators, expanded 
this theoretical literature on the real balance effect into a full–blown 
analysis of the impact of wealth changes induced by monetary policy 
(Ludvigson et al., 2002). 
 
2.4. The practice of monetary policy and bank credit in Uganda 
2.4.1. Overview of banking history in Uganda 
In 1906 the National Bank of India (NBI) was established in Uganda. The 
NBI later became Grindlays bank. Since then the banking sector has 
developed (Bategeka & Okumu, 2010). In 1962 before independence, the 
banking sector in Uganda was dominated by foreign owned commercial 
banks (Beck & Hesse, 2006). The Bank of Uganda (BOU) became the central 
bank in 1966. Since then, BOU has been controlling all currency issues and 
foreign exchange management (Nsambu, 2014). The East African 
Development Bank was established in 1967. In 1972 Uganda Development 
Bank and Uganda commercial banks were established whereby state–
owned banks dominated the banking sector (Bategeka & Okumu, 2010; 
Nsambu, 2014). 
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Bank of Uganda supervises and regulates financial institutions in 
Uganda according to Bank of Uganda statute 1993; with the following 
objectives: 
(i). to help ensure that, financial institutions maintain an adequate level 
of liquidity at all times, able to meet all known obligations and 
commitments and plans for unforeseen obligations and commitments. 
(ii).  to promote public confidence in financial institutions in Uganda 
through ensuring that they have adequate liquidity at all times. 
(ii).  to help ensure that financial institutions manage their liquidity by 
means of clear and well written policies which take into account all aspects 
of proper liquidity management. 
(iv). to provide guidance on compilation of accurate and timely liquidity 
returns (Bank of Uganda Statute, 1993; Nsambu, 2014). 
 In July 1999, according to the Bank of Uganda policy statement, 
financial institutions are classified into four Tiers. Tier IV is composed of 
financial institutions which are not regulated by bank of Uganda and are 
not authorized to take in deposits from the public but may offer collateral 
or non-collateral loans. Tier III comprises of Microfinance and Deposit 
taking Institutions (MDIs).  
Tier II consists of Credit institutions. Tier I is composed of Commercial 
banks. According to the classification, commercial banks are authorized to 
hold current, savings and fixed deposit accounts for both retail and 
corporate in local and international currency. On top of these, Commercial 
banks are authorized to transact the business of foreign exchange in all 
currencies (Nsambu, 2014). 
2.4.2. Monetary policy environment in Uganda since 1987 
In 1987, the IMF resumed the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 
Uganda. One of the major aims of SAP was mainly to reduce inflation and 
restore the sustainable balance of payments. The other was focused on the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), and was aimed at 
increasing (a) the competition in the financial sector, and (b) the range of 
financial instruments through an expanded financial infrastructure. The 
ESAP also targeted (i) the deregulation of interest rates, improving the 
overall process of financial intermediation, mobilization, and the allocation 
of resources and (ii) the removal of price controls and import licensing, as 
well as the progressive decontrol of foreign exchange management (Atingi–
Ego & Sebudde, 2000). 
Most of the structural adjustment and financial liberalization policies 
initiated in the early 1980s were meant for restoring the macro stability 
which did not fully happen until the 1990s (Kasekende & Atingi–Ego, 
2003). Macroeconomic stability was not attained until 1992, five years after 
the adjustment process was agreed upon by the IMF and the World Bank. 
For instance, in Uganda during the period 1986 to 1992 average inflation 
rate was 108 percent per annum, average annual money supply growth 
was 105.5 percent, and the average annual GDP growth rate was 5.7 
percent per year. Domestic financing of budget and money supply during 
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the 1986 to 1992 period was only 1.2 percent and 6.3 percent of GDP 
respectively (Nyorekwa & Odhiambo, 2014).  
The liberalization of the exchange rate commenced in 1990. As a result 
Government of Uganda legalized the foreign exchange bureaus and the 
adoption of the foreign exchange auctions. In 1991, the Treasury bill market 
was transformed to a system whereby interest rates were market–
determined. Controls on government expenditure were instituted in 1992. 
Thus, monetary policy was created to control inflation and the Foreign 
Exchange reserves (Mikkelsen & Peiris, 2005). 
Before 1993, Uganda maintained strict restrictions on both current and 
capital account. But in July 1994, the interest rates were fully liberalized. 
Consequently, in July of 1997 the capital account of balance of payments 
was liberalized. As a result, there have been no restrictions on capital 
movements in or out of Uganda since then. The Uganda Capital Markets 
Authority and the Uganda Securities were established in 1996 and 1997 
respectively. The liberalization and removal of restrictions on capital 
markets, opened doors for the external players to invest in the Uganda 
securities (Nyorekwa & Odhiambo, 2014). 
The Bank of Uganda statute of 1993, mandates the Bank of Uganda with 
the exclusive responsibility for monetary policy. Consequently, the Reserve 
Money Program (RMP) was adopted. Thus, the post–independence 
monetary abandoned framework of direct controls. Since then, the reserve 
money became the operating target. The new policy is premised on the 
macro-economic targets of inflation, economic growth and balance of 
payments (Opolot et al., 2013). 
When the interest rates were liberalized, one of the monetary policy 
tools prevailing in the 1990s that BOU retained was the control of the 
rediscount rate.  
The economic reforms lasted for almost a decade. But the weakness of 
the financial sector in Uganda remained as reflected by the numerous bank 
failures in the mid–1990s. Towards the end of the 1990s, a two–year 
moratorium was instituted against licensing any new banks. When it was 
lifted the number of banks increased from nine in 1991 to 20 in 1996. 
However, the number of banks reduced to 15 when a number of 
commercial banks became insolvent between 1997 and 2000. During this 
period government continued to divest its shares in the commercial banks 
(Opolot et al., 2013; Nyorekwa & Odhiambo, 2014). 
The Bank of Uganda, amended its role on the commercial banks through 
stringent and prudent enforcement of the Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 
The Act, was amended in 2002, with the aim of strengthening supervision 
and regulatory roles of the Central Bank. Subsequently the Micro Finance 
Deposit–taking Institutions Act of 2003 was set up. As a result four micro 
finance institutions were licensed to take deposits. This was followed by 
established of the Financial Stability Department in July 2009 at BOU with 
the mandate to analyze and monitor systemic risks to the financial system 
(Opolot et al., 2013; Nyorekwa & Odhiambo, 2014). 
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In 2009, the Reserve Monetary Program (RMP) was modified, and a 
flexible version of the RMP was adopted, with Net Domestic Assets (NDA) 
as the operating target. As a result, in July 2011, the RMP base–money 
targeting was replaced by “Inflation Targeting Lite (IFL)”. Consequently, 
and most importantly, monetary policy regime changed from monetary 
base to interest rate as the operating instrument for monetary policy i.e. the 
central bank rate (CBR). With the interest rate as the operating target of 
monetary policy, the CBR is set monthly and used to guide 7–day interbank 
interest rates. The BOU often uses the CBR to signal policy (Nyorekwa & 
Odhiambo, 2014). 
In the monetary policy framework, the monetary policy objectives is 
inflation–targeting aimed at continually achieving (a) low and stable 
inflation since price stability is the primary objective, (b) a monetary policy 
mandate of enhancing economic growth through enhanced private sector 
credit, improvement balance of payments and financial stability. The 
monthly policy tool used to achieve financial stability are: policy rate, 
foreign exchange intervention, rediscount policy and open market 
operations (BOU, 2013; IMF, 2013; Nyorekwa & Odhiambo, 2014).  
Uganda has experienced rapid growth from 1991 to 2011 with an 
average annual real growth rate of 7 percent. The high economic growth 
during the two decades was associated with increased monetization, 
financial deepening, and controlling inflation over the past two decades. 
However, the estimated money multiplier and the velocity have over the 
years been unstable in the short run (Davoodi et al., 2013). The high interest 
rates in Uganda are partly due to the oligopolistic nature of the banking 
sector, the size and competition in the informal sector, coupled with the 
restrictive monetary policy (Adam, 2009; Bank of Uganda, 2013; Nyorekwa 
& Odhiambo, 2014). 
2.4.3. Financial structure in Uganda 
The financial system in Uganda is composed of small and concentrated 
private banks, a large informal financial sector, shallow capital markets, 
short–yield curves, and of recent more increased dollarization. The foreign 
currency deposits as a share of total deposits in the banking system account 
for 33.8 percent (BOU, 2013). This exceeds the IMF 2011 estimates of LICs, 
and the HIC share of 12.8% and 0.4%, respectively (Berg et al., 2013).  
By 2013, the financial system in Uganda was composed of the BOU, 26 
commercial banks, 8 credit institutions, and 4 micron–finance deposit-
taking institutions, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), a postal bank, 
25 insurance companies, 2 development banks, 102 foreign–exchange 
bureaus, and the Uganda Securities Exchange. In December 2012, the 
commercial banks owned approximately 99.98 percent of the total assets of 
the deposit–taking institutions in the financial system (Opolot et al., 2013).  
The banking industry is concentrated. The top five banks dominate the 
asset share. The stock market capitalization remains low in terms volume of 
stock traded as the share of GDP. Thus, the low development of the 
financial markets. However, banks in Ugandan remain well–capitalized. 
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With high profits, the banks have adequate capital buffers to withstand 
shocks. In June 2013, the Leverage ratio, as a new indicator of capital 
adequacy in banks, stood at 12. Percent. This far above the minimum of 
three per cent, as recommended by the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision (BOU, 2013; Twinoburyo & Odhiambo, 2017). 
According to IMF Uganda is classified as a floating regime where the 
authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market to maintain stability in 
the foreign–exchange market. Since 2010, in order to build up reserve, the 
BOU has been conducting daily purchases, while occasionally engaging in 
targeted sales when necessary (Opolot et al., 2013). In the updated financial 
index values of 2011, Uganda has a score of 2.44 (Chinn & Ito, 2007; 
Twinoburyo & Odhiambo, 2017). 
From the time Uganda was liberalized, its capital account index 
indicates that the economy of Uganda has been the most open economy in 
the East African Region. In 1997 this index was 0.15 and it rose to 2.44 in 
2011. By comparison, the index for Uganda was even higher than the index 
for the United States and the United Kingdom in 2011 which stood at 2.39.  
The ratio of total external assets and liabilities to GDP for Uganda more 
than doubled, from 0.31 in 1991 to 0.66 in 2011, indicating an increase in the 
degree of openness of the economy to international capital flows (Lane & 
Milesi–Ferretti, 2006). In 1999 portfolio investments that were almost zero. 
But rose to US$0.25 million in 2000 and increased to US$1005 million in 
2013. The highest rise observed was from US$335 million in 2012 to 
US$1005 in 2013 (Twinoburyo & Odhiambo, 2017). 
2.4.4. Recent case of monetary policy and bank credit in Uganda 
In 2011, when elections were over runaway inflation followed. To avoid 
inflation after the 2016 election year the Central Bank took high 
precautionary measures. Thus, during the first half of FY 2015/16, the Bank 
of Uganda (BOU) reinforced measures to counteract the inflationary 
pressures that it had forecasted. Thus, the Central Bank raised its key 
policy rate (CBR) from 13 percent in June 2015 to 17 percent in October 
2015, a level that was maintained until April 2016.  
Moreover, margins on the bank rate and rediscount rate were widened 
to make it harder for commercial banks to access funds from the BOU. 
Furthermore, the BOU reduced the level of currency in circulation through 
(a) net sales of its short–term instrument i.e. repurchase of security 
agreement and (b) sales of foreign currency valued to be in excess of US$ 
400 million within a period of six months. Thus relieving pressure on the 
Uganda shilling (World Bank, 2016, p.6). 
The yields on government securities increased sharply during the first 
half of FY2015/16, possibly due to market uncertainty in the period prior to 
the election. The 91–day Treasury bill rate rose to 18.3 percent by 
November 2015, up from 12.8 percent in July 2014. This increase might 
have strengthened the Ugandan currency by attracting inward portfolio 
flows as a result of increased investor demand for government securities. 
But it increased the cost of borrowing for the Government. The 
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Government reacted by reducing its borrowing from the financial system 
by 10 percent over the first half of FY 2015/16. Commercial banks 
responded by sharply increasing their average lending rates from 20.8 
percent in 2014 to 25.2 percent between April 2015 and February 2016. 
Thus, tight monetary conditions, coupled with low commodity prices, 
reduced inflation pressure and the rate of inflation declined to 5.1 percent 
by April 2016 (World Bank, 2016, p.6). 
During the first half of FY 2015/16, financial institutions experienced 
rapid increase in the supply of credit to the private sector. Within this 
period, the rate of credit growth on average was 24 percent, almost double 
the average rate of 13 percent recorded during the same period in FY 
2014/15. In October 2015 the effect of high interest rates began to be felt, 
when the rate of growth of credit began to decelerate until it reached 8.7 
percent per annum by March 2016. The highest proportion of the credit was 
utilized to finance activities in building, mortgage, construction and retail 
estate, which accounted for 23 percent of total credit. Next was trade, which 
accounted for 19.8 percent; comprising of personal and household sector 
(14.8 percent); and by the manufacturing sector (15 percent) (World Bank, 
2016, p.7). 
The total value of credit denominated in foreign currency grew by 38 
percent during the first quarter of the year, compared to a growth of 21 
percent during the corresponding period in FY 2014/15. During this period, 
the depreciation of the shilling rose up to 40 percent per annum in 
September 2015. The shilling denominated credit had very low growth 
rates, ranging from 8 percent to 15 percent in the same period. Thus, the 
dollar denominated credit accounted for 45 percent of the total value of 
credit by March 2016. Borrowing in foreign currency creates opportunities 
for borrowers to access lower cost credit; allows them to diversify loan 
portfolios; and to hedge the risks associated with the volatility of the local 
currency (World Bank, 2016, p.7). 
Over the first half of the 2016, the value of the credit provided grew 
rapidly, at 57 percent in the case of the building, mortgage, construction, 
and real estate sector and at 53 percent in the case of the manufacturing 
sector. In contrast there was an average increase of five percent in the case 
of the former and a decrease of seven percent in the case of the latter during 
the corresponding period in FY 2014/15. The manufacturing sector 
generates revenues in foreign currency because it exports some of its 
produce. Similarly, some categories of real estate collect their rent in 
foreign currency. However, a significant proportion of the borrowers 
exposed to these businesses face high exchange rate risk because they 
operate domestically and have revenues solely denominated in shillings 
(World Bank, 2016, p.8). 
 
2.5. Empirics of monetary policy and bank credit 
Mankiw (1994) notes that “Monetary policy is not easy. Central bankers 
have multiple objectives and, over time, must confront a variety of 
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economic circumstances. They know their actions have powerful effects on 
the economy, but the timing, magnitude, and channels of those effects are 
not fully understood.  
Their job is made all the more difficult by widespread disagreements 
among economists. Some economists view monetary policy as a potential 
cure for economic fluctuations. Others would be satisfied if monetary 
policy could avoid being a cause of fluctuations.” The economists disagree. 
For instance the monetarist view of the transmission mechanism is sharply 
at odds with the neoclassical synthesis, which tends to view the main 
channels of transmission as working through credit availability and 
secondly through the effect of long–term interest rates on investment. 
Monetarists regarded both of those channels as secondary and focus on 
money rather than credit channels (Goodfriend & King, 1997). 
The traditional view of the transmission mechanism is called the money 
view. It holds that contractionary monetary policy reduces spending by 
raising interest rates. Recently, attention has centered on an additional 
channel of monetary policy. Which is the reduction in bank lending that 
must accompany a reduction in reserves. Kashyap & Stein (1993) and 
Miron et al. (1993) offer alternative perspectives on the importance of this 
new lending view (Mankiw, 1994). 
The traditional money view holds that there is one important distinction 
among types of assets: assets used for transactions (money) and those held 
only as a store of value (bonds). In contrast, under the lending view, there 
are three types of assets: money, bonds, and bank loans. Both bonds and 
bank loans earn interest. But bank loans are not perfectly substitutable with 
bonds. Banks make loans presumably because loans offer a higher return 
than bonds. The borrowers need these loans because they do not have 
access to bond markets. Lending view holds that when the central bank 
reduces reserves, it not only raises the interest rate on bonds, but it also 
reduces the supply of bank loans (Kashyap & Stein, 1993). 
Miron et al. (1993) examine changes over time in the importance of the 
lending channel. Firstly, they employ a simple theoretical model to isolate 
the observable factors that affect this channel’s strength. Secondly, they 
show that several changes in the economy; the composition of bank assets, 
the composition of external firm finance, and reserve requirements; should 
have made the lending channel stronger before 1929 than during the period 
immediately after World War 11. They find that conventional indicators of 
the importance of the lending channel, such as the spread between the loan 
rate and the bond rate and the correlation between loans and output, do 
not exhibit the predicted decline in the importance of the lending channel. 
They suggest that either the traditional indicators are not good measures of 
the strength of the lending channel, or the lending channel has not been 
quantitatively important in any era (Mankiw, 1994). 
De Bond (1998) uses disaggregated data on balance sheets to examine 
the existence of credit channels of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (MPTM) in Europe as a whole for the 1990 to 1995 period.  The 
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empirical results show the monetary credit channels of MPTM in Europe. 
In particular, the BLC is found to be strong in Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  Meanwhile the BLC is found to be relatively strong again in 
Germany but to a lesser extent in France and Italy during the sample 
period.  Motivated by the experience of South Korea during financial crisis, 
Kim (1999) examines whether the credit channel is the key monetary 
transmission mechanism in the country. The paper finds convincing 
evidence of the credit channel (the bank lending channel) in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis.  
Therefore, bank lending is found to play a significant independent role 
in amplifying the real effects of tightened monetary policy, which was 
implemented in response to the crisis (Kim, 1999). 
Alfaro et al. (2003) examines the presence of bank lending channel in 
Chile during the period 1990 to 2002 using data from both the banking 
sector and the corporate sector. They estimate a VAR system to test 
whether or not this channel exacerbates the effect of a monetary policy 
shock over macroeconomic activity. Their conclusion is that the bank 
lending channel in Chile has operated through a monetary policy 
transmission mechanism during the sample period. The transmission 
channel has an independent and significant effect in terms of 
macroeconomic activity (Alfaro et al., 2003). 
Sun et al. (2010) test the existence of the bank lending channel to explain 
the monetary policy transmission in China from 1997Q1 through 2008Q4. 
In the identified loan supply equation, loan supply is negatively related to 
required reserve ratios and official one–year lending rate in the long term. 
This confirms the existence of a lending channel for monetary transmission 
in China. The short term dynamics of the vector error correction model 
(VECM) show that the short–run disequilibria in the loan supply are 
corrected through changes in the lending rate, suggesting that monetary 
policy plays a role in restoring equilibrium in the credit market by affecting 
the official commercial bank lending rate. Thus, the result confirms that 
bank lending channel plays an important role in China’s monetary policy 
transmission (Sun et al., 2010). 
Khundrakpam (2011) examines the operation of credit channel of 
monetary policy transmission in India through change in policy rate within 
the 2001:3 to 2011:3 period, when interest rate became the main instrument 
of signaling policy stance in India. Results obtained show that: (a) nominal 
or real bank credit in India is contemporaneously influenced by the 
corresponding growth in economic activity and nominal or real 
deposit/money supply growth. (b) The positive influence of economic 
activity on bank credit, policy induced expansion or contraction in deposit 
or money supply makes banks to adjust their credit portfolio 
correspondingly. (c) Inflation and exchange rate appreciation have negative 
effect on the growth of bank credit with a long lag of nine months. This lag 
in transmission is found to be consistently true across various sub-sample 
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periods obtained through rolling regression technique (Khundrakpam, 
2011). 
Oni & Ozemhoka (2013) assess the impact of monetary policy on bank 
credit creation in Nigeria during the 1980 to 2010 period. They use the 
ordinary least square (OLS) method of regression analysis. Their results 
indicate positive linear relationship between total credit and (a) total 
deposits and (b) total credit and treasury bills rate. But the reserve 
requirement ratio and interest rate are found to be negatively related to 
total credit creation (Oni & Ozemhoka, 2013). Mugume (2011) applies 
structural VAR models to quarterly data for 1999–2009. He finds all the 
channels of monetary transmission to be ineffective. In particular, the 
interest rate channel remains weak, even though there is some evidence for 
a transmission of Treasury bill rate changes to lending interest rates.  
Opolot et al. (2013) examines the relevance of the bank lending channel 
in monetary policy transmission of Uganda using a bank level data for the 
period Q1 2001 to Q4 2012. Investigations are conducted on effects of 
individual bank characteristics (size, liquidity, and capitalization) on the 
loan supply function of banks.  
The dynamic panel data framework is estimated by using a generalized 
method of moment (GMM) dynamic panel estimator of Arellano & Bond 
(1991). His study finds that individual bank characteristics of liquidity and 
capitalization play a significant role in influencing the supply of bank 
loans. Therefore, his empirical results indicate the presence of the bank 
lending channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
Uganda.  
Antigi–Ego (2000) compares interest rate with monetary base targeting 
as a monetary policy instrument in the Ugandan economy by using a small 
structural VAR model that captures the structural dynamic features 
representing Uganda’s economy. His research analysis is done using the 
VAR model with a sample data on Uganda for the period 1981:1 to 1997:4. 
The SVAR results he gets indicate that the transmission effects from interest 
rate is rapid compared to the effects from base money (Kamati, 2014).  
Loayza & Schmidt–Hebbel (2002) empirically examines monetary 
transmission channels in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. By 
using the VAR approach, he finds the interest rate and exchange rate 
channels to be important in all of the aforementioned countries, but finds 
the asset price and credit channels not to be important in any of these 
countries. Angeloni et al. (2001) examines the monetary transmission 
mechanisms in euro area countries, by using the aggregate euro countries 
data. They find that the monetary policy has a significant effect on output 
and price. Secondly, they find that a temporary reduction on output for 
increases in short term interest rate while the response of price is slow. 
Thirdly, by employing a country specific data of some European countries: 
Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, they show that 
interest rate and credit channels are the most significant transmission 
channels in the area (Mohammed, 2013). 
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Morsink & Bayoumi (2003) use the VAR models with quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted data from 1980Q1 to 1998Q3, to analyze the effect of 
monetary shock on the Japanese economy. They find that both interest rate 
and broad money significantly affect output. They then conclude that both 
monetary policy and banks’ balance sheets channels are important sources 
of output shocks. Secondly, they conclude that bank lending channel play a 
crucial role in transmitting monetary shocks to economic activity. Al–
Mashat & Billmeier (2008) investigates the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Egypt, by using VAR model on seasonally adjusted monthly 
data within the period 1998 to 2008. They find that the exchange rate 
channel plays a greater role more than the bank lending and asset price 
channels do in propagating monetary shocks to output and prices 
(Mohammed, 2013). 
Mohammed, (2013) investigates empirically the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Ethiopia by using vector error correction mechanism 
(VECM). In addition, impulse response functions (IRF) and variance 
decompositions (VDC) techniques are employed to assess the relative 
strength of each channel. He finds that monetary policy in Ethiopia has a 
relatively significant influence on the real activity through the direct 
monetary transmission and exchange rate channel. Secondly, his results 
suggest an inactive interest rate channel and implies weak existence of a 
credit channel.  
Cheng (2006) uses recursive and non–recursive structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) to monthly data in Kenya for the period 1997 to 
2005 and finds evidence for the presence of the traditional transmission 
channels.  
The study finds that a contractionary monetary policy (a measure of 
monetary policy used in the paper) leads to an initial increase in the price 
level, followed by a fall in the price level. This effect is found to be 
statistically significant for about two years following the shock. In response 
to a contractionary monetary policy, output rises initially but falls 
eventually, though the decline is not statistically significant (Davoodi et al., 
2013).  
Maturu et al. (2010) applied a similar methodology to that of Cheng 
(2006) in their study monetary transmission mechanism in Kenya using 
quarterly data for the period 200 to 2010. They use M3 as the monetary 
policy instrument and find that an exogenous shock to M3 (i.e. an 
expansionary monetary policy) has no effect on real output, but leads to 
rising prices for almost 18 months, and is found to be statistically 
significant. A positive shock to the interest rate leads to falling prices, much 
like Cheng (2006) finds, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
Movements in M3 explains as much of inflation variability arising from 
movements in interest rate that Cheng (2006) finds (Davoodi et al., 2013). 
Sichei & Njenga (2012) empirically investigates bank lending channel 
(BLC) of monetary policy. 
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Transmission in Kenya using annual bank level panel data for the period 
2001 to 2008. They find that BLC exists in Kenya based on bank liquidity 
and capitalization. They therefore, conclude that banks with less liquid 
balance sheets and low total capital to risk–weighted asset ratios could 
have been hit most by monetary policy. They reason that since low 
liquidity and banks with low capital base are generally large banks 
comprising of 82 percent of total bank credit, BLC is found to be significant 
in Kenya. As a result, the existence of BLC implies that monetary policy has 
asymmetric effects on banks and borrowers in Kenya. Therefore, bank 
credit may be used as a nominal anchor for monetary policy and a leading 
indicator for economic activity in Kenya.  
Chileshe (2017) examines the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
in Zambia by using a bank level panel data covering the period Q1 2005 to 
Q4 2016. The study investigates the effects of monetary policy changes on 
loan supply by commercial as well as the effect of response of loan supply 
to monetary policy shocks. Using a dynamic panel data approaches 
developed by Arellano & Bond (1991), the results indicate that a bank 
lending channel exists in Zambia. The results further show that loan supply 
is negatively related to policy rate, implying that when monetary policy is 
tightened loan supply shrinks. Secondly, the results indicate that size, 
liquidity and bank competiveness effect credit supply while capitalization 
has no effect. Thirdly, the results show that bank size has negative effect on 
credit supply while liquidity and market power enhance credit supply 
(Chileshe, 2017).  
Kigabo (2018) uses the VAR model to assess monetary transmission 
mechanisms in Rwanda during the period 2006Q–2014Q4. The findings 
show that the banking sector in Rwanda is small and banks are more 
competitive in the deposit rather than in the loan market. Therefore, the 
effect of monetary policy actions on the cost of banking loans is constrained 
because the interest rate pass through to the lending rate remains very 
weak.  
Due to the introduction of a more flexible exchange rate policy and the 
decline in foreign resources, the exchange rate channel has started 
improving. There is clear evidence that the credit channel is active in 
Rwanda and that could be due to increasing monetization of the domestic 
economy (Kigabo, 2018). 
According to Berg et al. (2013), many central banks in Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries are modernizing their monetary policy frameworks. They 
note that standard statistical procedures have had limited success in 
identifying the channels of monetary transmission in such countries. As a 
result they take a narrative approach, following Romer & Romer (1989), 
and center on a significant tightening of monetary policy that took place in 
2011 in four members of the East African Community: Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania and Rwanda (Berg et al., 2013). However, this paper takes a more 
efficient and simplified version of the standard statistical procedure, the 
generalized least squares (GLS) technique. 
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Moreover, the paper finds it appropriate to use monthly data in the 
empirical analysis because According to Walsch (2010), standard 
macroeconomic theory suggests that monetary policy has little impact on 
the growth of real output in the long run. Real sector variables (e.g. skills 
and technology) determine the long run steady state output (Sichei & 
Njenga, 2012). Meanwhile in the short term, monetary policy can 
significantly influence the course of the real economy (Barnanke & Gertter, 
1995). The challenges to identifying the transmission mechanism in the data 
are great anywhere particularly in Low Income Countries (LICs). Studies 
embracing the effects of monetary policy on activity and prices in LICs 
have greatly relied on the use of statistical techniques such as VARs, SVAR, 
VECMs, and single–equation estimation, and often find weak or 
insignificant effects of monetary policy (Davoodi et al., 2013; Mishra et al., 
2012). 
As elsewhere, policy is endogenous to events in the economy. More than 
elsewhere, the structure of the economy itself is evolving, for example as 
the financial system develops. Meanwhile, large supply shocks are frequent 
and data noisy and scarce. Thus, analysis based on VARs; which require 
relatively long times series with consistent policy frameworks is likely to be 
unfruitful (Berg et al., 2013). This paper avoids the errors by making use of 
a simple GLS technique. Romer & Romer (1989) advocate for the “narrative 
approach” for identifying the effects of monetary policy. The narrative 
approach deals with the identification of monetary shocks through non–
statistical procedure. The method involves using the historical records to 
identify episodes when there were large shifts in monetary policy or in the 
behavior of monetary policy that were not driven by developments on the 
real side of the economy.” (Romer & Romer, 1989, p.1). 
Views on the real effects of monetary policy in the United States have 
been more influenced by the narrative arguments of Friedman & Schwartz 
(1963), than by formal statistical analysis (Romer & Romer, 1989; Summers, 
1991). By using the narrative approach Berg et al. (2013) find that the events 
in their study suggests that the transmission mechanism in the East African 
economies is alive and well. They observe that after a large policy induced 
rise in the short-term interest rate, lending and other interest rates rise, the 
exchange rate tends to appreciate, output tends to fall, and inflation 
declines. In particular, they find the clearest transmission in Uganda, where 
the Inflation Targeting Lite regime, itself is simpler and more transparent 
(Berg et al., 2013). 
 
2.6. Money creation in the modern economy 
In the modern economy, money is largely created by commercial banks 
making loans. The vast majority of money held by the public is composed 
of bank deposits. However, where the stock of bank deposits comes from is 
often misunderstood.  
One common fallacy is that banks act simply as intermediaries, lending 
out the deposits that savers keep with them. In this view deposits are 
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typically created by the saving decisions of households, and banks then 
‘lend out’ those existing deposits to borrowers. What households save in 
bank accounts are deposits that come simply at the expense of deposits that 
would have otherwise gone to companies in payment for goods and 
services. Savings raise the deposits or funds available for banks to lend. 
Thus, viewing banks simply as intermediaries ignores the fact that, in 
reality in the modern economy, commercial banks are the creators of 
deposit money (McLeay & Radia, 2014).  
Another common fallacy is that the central bank determines the quantity 
of loans and deposits in the economy by controlling the quantity of central 
bank money. According to this view central banks execute monetary policy 
by choosing the size of reserves. Thus, for banks to crate money optimally, 
the central bank must directly determine the number of reserves. The truth 
is that rather than controlling the quantity of reserves, central banks today 
are compelled to implement monetary policy by setting the price of 
reserves i.e. interest rates (McLeay & Radia, 2014).  
The relationship between reserves and loans typically operates in the 
reverse way to that described in some economics textbooks. The amount of 
bank deposits determines how much of central bank money, banks want to 
hold in reserve (to meet withdrawals by the public, make payments to 
other banks, or meet regulatory liquidity requirements). Normally, the 
deposits are supplied by the central bank. Lending creates aggregate 
deposits in the banking system called broad money. Broad money is total 
amount of money held by the households and companies in the economy. 
Broad money is composed of deposits. In the modern economy, bank 
deposits are mostly created by commercial banks. For instance in the 
United Kingdom bank deposits constituted 97 percent of the total amount 
of money in circulation as of December 2013 (McLeay & Radia, 2014). 
 Commercial banks create money, by making new loans out of bank 
deposits. For instance, when a bank makes a loan to its customer as a 
mortgage to buy a house, in principle it does not give them thousands of 
banknotes. Rather, it credits the bank account of the customer with a bank 
deposit of the size of the mortgage, and instantly a new money is created. 
The new deposits increase the assets of the consumers (i.e. households and 
companies). Meanwhile, the new loan increases their liabilities. The bank 
deposits are just records of how much the bank itself owes its customers. 
Thus they are a liability of the bank, not an asset that could be lent out. A 
bank’s business model is based on the rule of receiving a higher interest 
rate on the loans (or other assets) than the rate it pays out on its deposits (or 
other liabilities) (McLeay & Radia, 2014). 
It is interesting to note that Werner (2014) rejects the notion that 
commercial banks create money, by making new loans out of bank 
deposits. Instead, he believes that banks individually create credit and 
money out of nothing and they do this when they extend credit. In a similar 
way some economists have referred to bank deposits as ‘fountain pen 
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money,’ created at the stroke of bankers’ pens when they approve loans 
(McLeay & Radia, 2014). Fountain pen money is what  
Tobin (1963) takes to be the fact that banks cannot create unlimited 
amounts of money in practice. 
Due to the central importance of deposits in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism (MPTM), it can be used in the determination of 
the transmission channels of monetary policy. Moreover, when combined 
with other variables, the bank deposit can be used to determine their joint 
and individual effects on bank credit as well as their role in enhancing the 
(MPTM). 
 
2.7. New contributions to knowledge 
The study is quite different from the previous papers because it 
examines the influence of various monetary and fiscal variable on bank 
credit in Uganda during the period January 2008 to December 2017. The 
paper makes an evaluation of the existence of the bank credit channel in 
Uganda, in terms examining the response of bank credit to the following 
variables: 
 
(a) Annual Treasury bill    (b) Bank deposits  
(c) Consumer price index (CPI=P)   (d) Claims on central government 
(e) Currency in circulation    (f) Demand deposits rate 
(g) Demand for money (M2/P)   (h) Domestic credit 
(i) Domestic deposit    (j) Exchange Rate 
(k) Exports      (l) External debt servicing 
(m) Government bond    (n) Imports   
(o) Interbank Rate     (p) Interest rate (real lending rate) 
(q) Monetary base     (r) Money supply (M2) 
(s) Net Equity     (t) Net foreign assets 
(u) Real gross domestic product (GDP)  (v) Rediscount rate 
(w) Reserves     (x) Savings rate   
(y) Velocity of Money in the entire economy (z) Velocity of money in the credit market 
 
At a theoretical level the paper develops models (i.e. equations) for 
deeper understanding of the role of bank credit in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. It attempts to point out the fallacy existing in the 
quantity theory of credit advanced by Werner (2014) and in particular the 
notion of velocity of credit. The paper then advances another theory of 
quantity theory of money and in particular the velocity of money in the 
credit market as well as the velocity of money in the deposit market.  
The paper disagrees with idea advanced by Werner (2014) that 
individual banks create money out of nothing. Instead the paper accepts 
the notion that banks create money out of deposits when an individual 
bank offers loans to its customers. At both the theoretical and empirical 
levels the paper that (a) the relationship between deposits and credit work 
in the reverse direction, (b) the relationship between reserves and bank 
credit work in the reverse direction. 
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At the methodological level, the study is quite different from most of the 
previous studies that tended to use the OLS, VAR and ECM in their 
analysis of issues pertaining to the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (MPTM). Instead, the paper uses the generalized least squares 
(GLS) method to analyze issues regarding the MPTM. Moreover, the paper 
goes to discover a new GLS technique with full proof. 
At an empirical level the paper finds the existence of the bank credit 
channel in Uganda contrary to what some previous studies conducted on 
MPTM in the country have found. Other channels like exchange rate 
channel, asset prices channel, interest rate channel and fiscal channel were 
found to be present in Uganda during the sample period. It should be 
noted that in principle the paper agrees with Greenwood et al. (2016) that 
monetary policymakers can undertake large scale asset purchase program 
to effectively retire net national debt and reduce the interest expense of the 
government (Jordan, 2017). 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1. Theoretical framework of the bank credit and monetary policy 
transmission mechanism 
The monetary base (𝑀𝐵) is also called high–powered money.  The 𝑀𝐵  is 
the addition of currency in circulation is(𝐶𝑐)  and the total reserves in 
banking system (𝑅𝑒). The monetary base is given by 
 
𝑀𝐵 = 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑅𝑒         (1) 
 
The central bank controls the monetary base through its purchases or 
sale of government securities in the open market, called open market 
operations, and through its extension of discount loans to banks. A bond 
purchase by the central bank is called an open market purchase, and a 
bond sale by the central bank is called an open market sale. The effect of 
open market operations is much more certain on the monetary base than on 
the reserves. As a result, the central bank can control its monetary base 
more effectively through open market operations than it can do through 
reserves. However, the effect on deposit expansion is the same, whether a 
bank chooses to use its excess reserves to make loans or to purchase 
securities (Mishkin, 2004, pp.359–370). 
An increase in the deposit multiplier 𝑟𝑚  is generated by the multiple 
increase in deposits 𝐷 generated from an increase in the reserves 
(𝑅𝑒) within the banking system. 
 
𝑅𝑒 = 𝑟𝑚𝐷         (2) 
 
Substituting Equation (2) in (1) provides 
 
𝑀𝐵 = 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚𝐷        (3) 
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To obtain a relationship between bank credit and bank deposits (i.e. 
demand deposits), let the sum of deposits (𝐷𝑖) in the banking system of 
bank 𝑖 equals the money originally deposited 𝐵𝐷𝑖 in vault of bank 𝑖 plus the 
maximum possible credit expansion 𝐶𝑟𝑖 in bank 𝑖 (Stroup, 2006, p.184-224). 
 
  𝐶𝑟𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 − 𝐵𝐷𝑖  𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁     (4) 
 
Therefore, the total amount of bank credit (𝐶𝑟) equals the entire sum of 
deposits in the banking system having 𝑁  system of banks minus bank 




𝑖 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 − ∑ 𝐵𝐷𝑖
𝑁
𝑖        (5) 
or      
𝐷 = 𝐶𝑟 + 𝐵𝐷         (6) 
 
Therefore, the relationship between deposits in the banking sector (𝐷), 
share of the banking sector in the monetary base (𝜔)  and the monetary 
base  (𝑀𝐵), is represented by 
 
𝐷 = 𝜔𝑀𝐵         (7) 
or           
𝐶𝑟 + 𝐵𝐷 = 𝜔𝑀𝐵        (8) 
 
Hence, substituting Equation (3) in Equation (8) the relationship 
between bank credit and bank deposits is expressed as 
 
𝐶𝑟 + 𝐵𝐷 = 𝜔(𝐶𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚𝐷)       (9) 
 
The central bank can control the monetary base better than it can control 
reserves. Thus it makes sense to link the money supply  (𝑀𝑛)  to the 
monetary base  (𝑀𝐵)  as given in Equation (8), where 𝑚 is the money 
multiplier (Mishkin, 2004, p.375). 
 
𝑀𝑛 = 𝑚𝑀𝐵         (10) 
 
Substituting Equation (10) in Equation (8) provides 
 
𝐶𝑟 + 𝐵𝐷 = (𝜔/𝑚)𝑀𝑛        (11) 
or                    
𝐶𝑟 = (𝜔/𝑚)𝑀𝑛 − 𝐵𝐷        (12) 
 
Since the demand for money (𝑀𝑑 = 𝑀𝑛/𝑃) is the ratio of money supply 
(𝑀𝑛) to domestic price level (𝑃) then Equation (12) can be rewritten as: 
 
𝐶𝑟 = (𝜔/𝑚)(𝑀𝑑. 𝑃) − 𝐵𝐷       (13) 
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Similarly, since the money supply (𝑀𝑛) in the quantity theory of money 
is a function of velocity on money (𝑉), output (𝑌) and the general price 
level (𝑃) in domestic economy then Equation (12) can be rewritten as: 
 
𝐶𝑟 = (𝜔/𝑚)𝑃𝑌/𝑉 − 𝐵𝐷       (14)
  
 
Dividing through Equation (11) by the quantity of money supply we 
obtain 
 
(𝐶𝑟/𝑀𝑛) + (𝐵𝐷/𝑀𝑛) = (𝜔/𝑚)      (15) 
or           
𝑉𝐿𝐶 + 𝑉𝐵𝐷 = (𝜔/𝑚)        (16) 
 
Where 𝑉𝐿𝐶 is the velocity of money (liquidity) in the credit market and 
𝑉𝐵𝐷 is the velocity of money in the bank deposit market; implying that the 
idea of the velocity of money in credit market and the velocity of money in 
the bank deposits market are not problematic because their effects cancel 
out each other. 
As a result, in very simple terms the quantity of credit in the credit 
market becomes the product of money supply and the velocity of money in 
the credit market and is given by Equation (17). Thus this equation 
becomes the new quantity theory of credit. 
 
𝐶𝑟 = 𝑀𝑛𝑉𝐿𝐶         (17) 
 
Similarly, in very simple terms the quantity of bank deposit in the bank 
deposit market becomes the product of money supply and the velocity of 
money in the bank deposit market and is given by Equation (18). Thus this 
equation becomes the new quantity theory of bank deposit. 
 
𝐵𝐷 = 𝑀𝑛𝑉𝐵𝐷         (18) 
 
These two simple theories of velocity of money in money and bank 
deposit markets that the paper is advancing are important because they 
help in showing that growth in the velocity of money in the economy 
(𝑉) has negative consequences in quantity of credit as well as quantity of 
bank deposits. 
 
3.2. Werner’s quantity theory of credit 
According to Werner (2017) by the mid–1980s, the existing approaches 
in all the schools of economics: classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, 
monetarist and post–Keynesian approaches including eclectic models; 
although had their differences, they had much in common. That is because 
they still maintained monetary aggregate linked to nominal GDP through 
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the quantity equation. The quantity theory of money for the entire economy 
is commonly given by 
 
𝑃𝑌 = 𝑀𝑛𝑉         (19) 
 
Where 𝑃 is the price level of aggregate real income (output) in the 
economy, 𝑌 is the real output (GDP) in the economy, 𝑀𝑛 (measured and 
defined as Mo, M1, M2, M3 or M4) is the nominal quantity of money in the 
economy and 𝑉 is the income velocity of money (Werner, 2017). 
In Werner (2017), quantity theory of credit model, simplifies to 
 
𝑀𝑛𝑉 = 𝑃𝑌 = 𝑃𝑄 = 𝛼𝑃𝑅𝑄𝑅 = 𝛼𝑀𝑅𝑉𝑅      (20) 
and    
𝑀𝑛𝑉 = 𝑃𝑌 = 𝑃𝑄 = 𝛽𝑃𝐹𝑞𝐹 = 𝛽𝑀𝐹𝑉𝐹      (21) 
 
According to  Werner (2017): “This was first successfully implemented 
by Werner (1997, 1992). Substituting the slightly more intuitive letter ‘Q’ for 
the quantity of transactions, and following this framework, we choose to 
disaggregate both sides of (19), on the one hand into money used for 
transactions that are part of GDP (called (𝑀𝑅𝑉𝑅) and those that are not 
(called (𝑀𝐹𝑉𝐹), and on the other hand the value of transactions that are part 
of GDP (𝑃𝑅𝑄𝑅) which should be accurately proxied by nominal GDP (𝑃𝑅𝑌), 
and those that are not (𝑃𝐹𝑄𝐹) ….”  
“With a stable ‘real’ velocity of money, 𝑉𝑅 ,  the effective amount of 
money used for GDP transactions during any period of time (𝑀𝑅𝑉𝑅) must 
be equal to nominal GDP. Meanwhile, the amount of money effectively 
used for non–GDP transactions will be equal to the value of these non–GDP 
transactions.” Equations (19) and (20) have also been suggested by Werner 
(1992, 1994, 1995b, 1995a, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2003). 
Werner (2017) went ahead to avoid confusion by replacing letter ‘M’ 
with ‘C’, for credit. Hence the Quantity Theory of Credit (QTC) as 
presented by Werner (1997, 1992) boils down to: 
 
𝐶𝑉 = 𝑃𝑄 = 𝜇𝑀𝑛𝑉 = 𝜇𝑃𝑌       (22) 
 
Therefore, Equation (22) implies that there is a positive relationship 
between credit (𝐶 = 𝐶𝑟) and velocity of nominal money supply (𝑀 = 𝑀𝑛) 
i.e. 𝜕𝐶𝑟/𝜕𝑉 > 0. 
From Equation (22) it can be deduced that the money supply function is 
given by 
 
𝜇𝑀𝑛 = 𝜇𝑃𝑌/V         (23) 
 
Substitution of Equation (23) in Equation (11) provides 
 
𝐶𝑟 + 𝐵𝐷 = 𝜇 (
𝜔
𝑚
) 𝑃𝑌/𝑉       (24) 
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The constants 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜇 are used with intention of pinning down the fallacy 
existing in the QTC equations advanced by  Werner (2017) and Werner 
(2018). Therefore, Equation (24) implies that there is a negative relationship 
between credit (𝐶 = 𝐶𝑟) and velocity of nominal money supply (𝑀 = 𝑀𝑛) 
i.e. 𝜕𝐶𝑟/𝜕𝑉 < 0. Hence, Werner (2017) and Werner (2018) quantity theory of 
credit equations must be rejected because they provide equations of QTC 
that are inconsistent with reality, other theories and most probably 
empirical results regarding the relationship between bank credit and 
velocity of money. 
 
3.3. Interest rate and exchange rate channels 
The general price level (𝑃)is a function of nominal interest rate (𝑅𝑛) real 
interest rate (𝑅)  representing the return on assets (bonds, equities and 
physical assets) and is given by: 
 
𝑃 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑛) = 𝑓(𝑅)        (25) 
 
Substitution of equation (25) in (13) provides the interest rate channel 






− 𝐵𝐷        (26) 
or              




− 𝐵𝐷       (27) 
 
For the exchange rate channel it is clear that when demand for the 
domestic currency (money) increases the demand to hold the foreign 
currency falls, thus causing the nominal price of the foreign currency to fall, 
while the nominal price of the domestic currency rises; thus the foreign 
exchange rate depreciates (increases) in nominal terms vice versa. Thus the 
relationship between the demand for money and the nominal exchange 
rate becomes as shown in Equation (28). 
 
𝑀𝑑 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑅) = 𝜑𝐸𝑅        (28) 
 
Therefore, substituting Equation (28) in Equation (13) provides 
 
𝐶𝑟 = (𝜔/𝑚)(𝜑𝐸𝑅. 𝑃) − 𝐵𝐷       (29) 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Generalized least squares 
One of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model is that 
the error term 𝑢 is linearly and independently distributed (IID) with mean 
0 and variance 𝜎𝑢
2 as presented in Equation (30). 
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𝑢 = 𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)         (30) 
 
The generalized least squares (GLS) model is expressed as 𝑦 is a function 
of the 𝑥 variables where 𝑋 is a matrix of independent variables, 𝛽 is a vector 
of coefficients and 𝑢 is a vector of error terms. 
 
𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢         (31) 
Where mean error is  
 
𝐸(𝑢) = 0         (32) 
 
The variance is given by  
 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢) = 𝛴         (33) 
 
Where 𝜮 is a general symmetric positive matrix. 
Suppose that 𝜮 is known then  
 
𝑃′𝑃 = 𝛴−1         (34) 
 
Where  𝑃 is an upper triangular matrix. 
Thus     
 
𝑃′𝑃𝛴 = 𝐼𝑛         (35) 
or     
𝑃′𝑃𝛴𝑃′ = 𝑃′         (36) 
or     
𝑃𝛴𝑃′ = 𝐼𝑛         (37) 
 
Pre multiplying all the terms in Equation (31) by vector 𝑃 provides 
 
𝑃𝑦 = 𝑃𝑋𝛽 + 𝑃𝑢        (38) 
 
Equation (38) is simplified as follows: 
 
𝑦∗ = 𝑋∗𝛽 + 𝑢∗                       (39) 
Where  
𝑦∗ = 𝑃𝑦, 𝑋∗ = 𝑃𝑋, and 𝑢∗ = 𝑃𝑢.      (40) 
 
Therefore the variance of 𝑢∗ = 𝑃𝑢 is given by 
 
𝐸[𝑃𝑢𝑢′𝑃′] = 𝑃𝛴𝑃′ = 𝐼𝑛       (41) 
 
Equation (12) satisfies the following assumptions: 
 
𝐸(𝑢∗) = 0         (42) 
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𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢∗) = 𝐼𝑛        (43) 
 




∗′𝑋∗)−1𝑋∗′𝑦∗       (44) 
or             
?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋
′𝑃′𝑃𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑃′𝑦       (45) 
or            
?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋
′𝛴−1𝑋)−1𝑋′𝛴−1𝑦       (46) 
 
The GLS is estimator is unbiased under the same circumstances where 
the OLS is unbiased. Therefore, given that 𝑋 is non–stochastic (i.e. fixed in 
repeated sampling), then 
 
E[ ?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆] = [(𝑋
′𝛴−1𝑋)−1𝑋′𝛴−1𝑦]      (47) 
or     
E[ ?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆] = [(𝑋
′𝛴−1𝑋)−1𝑋′𝛴−1(𝑋𝛽 + 𝑦)]     (48) 
    ∴                
E[ ?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆] = 𝛽         (49) 
 
The variance of the GLS estimator can be obtained by rewriting 





(𝑋∗𝛽 + 𝑢∗)      (50) 
Thus           
?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆 = 𝛽 + (𝑋
∗′𝑋∗)−1𝑋∗
′
𝑢∗       (51) 
    ∴            









𝑋∗)−1]  (52) 








𝑋∗)−1     (53) 
    ∴        
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆) = (𝑋
∗′𝑋∗)−1       (54) 
Hence      
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆) = (𝑋
∗′𝛴−1𝑋∗)−1       (55) 
 
After the transformation of the GLS model into the OLS model by using 
the appropriate P vector, results regarding the desirable properties of the 
least squares estimator hold, since the transformed model satisfies the 
classical linear assumptions. Consequently, tests become valid by using the 
OLS formulae as long as substitution of 𝑋∗ is made in place of 𝑋. Thus any 
test that involves 𝜎𝑢
2 can set it to 1. The GLS estimator is more efficient than 
the OLS estimation technique, since it is based on (a) the Gauss–Markov 
Theorem and (b) a model that satisfies the classical assumptions, but the 
OLS estimator is less efficient. Hence, the GLS is more efficient because: 
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𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆) − 𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆) = (𝑋
′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝛴′𝛴𝑋(𝑋′𝑋)−1 − (𝑋′𝛴−1𝑋)−1 = 𝐴𝛴𝐴 (56) 





− (𝑋′𝛴−1𝑋)−1      (57) 
 
Therefore, the matrix is used to weight the residuals (Creel, 2014, pp. 
168–180). 
 
4.2. A new generalized least squares (GLS) technique discovered 
In the process of conducting research on bank credit and monetary 
transmission mechanism in Uganda a new and simpler (i.e. user friendly) 
GLS technique is discovered. This new technique is applicable where 
before regression each variable is multiplied by the reciprocal of 𝑑(𝑑(𝑌𝑡
2)) 
such that  𝑌𝑡
2  is the quantity of the dependent variable, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  represents 
quantity of the 𝑖th independent variable, 𝛽0 is the constant term, 𝛽𝑖 denotes 
the value of parameter for variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡, and 𝑢𝑡 is the value of the error term 
at time 𝑡. 
 
In econometrics a linier regression line can be expressed as 
 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑡 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡     (58) 
 
When Equation (58) is lagged by one period the resulting equation is 
given by 
 
𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑡−1 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡−1    (59) 
 
In terms of estimated values of ?̂?𝑡 Equations (58) and (59) may be 
rewritten as 
 
𝑌𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡         (60) 
𝑌𝑡−1 = ?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡−1        (61) 
 
Subtracting Equation (61) from Equation (60) gives 
 
(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1) = (?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡−1) + (𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡−1)     (62) 
 
Differencing Equation (62) provides 
 
𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1) = 𝑑(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡−1) + 𝑑(𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡−1)     (63) 
or             
𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1) = 𝑑(𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡−1)       (64) 
 
The 𝑑(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡−1) = 0 because the slope of a regression line is constant.  
In other words after differencing for each term the difference equals zero 
since ?̂?𝑖[𝑑(𝑋𝑖𝑡) − 𝑑(𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)] equals zero in all cases, where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑘. 
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After differencing Equation (58) in order to derive an appropriate vector 
for making variance of the error terms i.e. (𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡−1) constant, the variance 
in Equation (64) is taken and the end result is:          
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1)] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑡−1)]     (65) 
or         
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡) − 𝑑(𝑌𝑡−1)] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑡−2)   (66) 
or   
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1)] = [𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑡) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑡−1)] − [𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑡−1) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑡−2)] (67) 
 
Further decomposition of the variance of terms in Equation (67) gives: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1)] = [𝐸(𝑌𝑡
2 − ?̅?2) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑡−1
2 − ?̅?2)] − [𝐸(𝑌𝑡−1
2 − ?̅?2) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑡−2
2 −
?̅?2)]          (68) 
or   
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1)] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑡
2 − ?̅?2 − 𝑌𝑡−1
2 + ?̅?2] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑡−1
2 − ?̅?2 − 𝑌𝑡−2
2 + ?̅?2] (69) 
Or 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1)] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑡
2 − 𝑌𝑡−1
2 ] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑡−1
2 − 𝑌𝑡−2
2 ]      (70) 
or  
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1)] = 𝐸[𝑑(𝑌𝑡
2) − 𝑑(𝑌𝑡−1
2 )]       (71) 
or   
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1)] = 𝐸[𝑑(𝑑(𝑌𝑡
2))]        (72) 
or   
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1)] =  𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑑(𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡−1)] = 𝐸[𝑑(𝑑(𝑌𝑡
2))] )] = 𝐸[𝑑(𝑑(𝑢𝑡
2))] (73) 
or     
𝐸[𝑑(𝑑(𝑌𝑡
2))] = 𝑑(𝑑(𝐸(𝑢𝑡
2)))       (74) 
Hence         
𝑑(𝑑(𝑌𝑡
2))  = 𝑑(𝑑(𝜎𝑢𝑡
2 ))       (75) 
 
Thus, a constant variance (1) can be obtained after multiplying the 
difference of the errors in a regression [(𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡−1)] by the reciprocal of the 
vector  [1/𝑑(𝑑(𝜎𝑢𝑡






























1          (76) 
 
4.3. Description of variables used in empirical analysis 
Each of the variables considered falls at least under one of the following 
channels (a) asset price channel: interest rate, exchange rate, equity prices 
and wealth effect, and (b) credit channel: bank lending, balance sheet and 
unanticipated prices. All the quantities of the variables considered are in 
terms of monthly figures running from January 2008 to December 2017. 
However, some of the variables were estimated by using estimator (i.e. 
formulae) for example the velocity of money (𝑉) variable was estimated by 
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using the formula: 𝑉 = (𝑃𝑌/𝑀𝑛), where 𝑌 is gross domestic product,  𝑃 is 
the price level of aggregate goods and services and (𝑀𝑛) is the quantity of 
money supply in the economy. 
 
Table 1. List of variables used in empirical analysis along with their descriptions 
1. ATB 364–day (annual) Treasury bill yield interest rate in percent 
2. BD bank deposit in shillings 
3. CC  currency in circulation in shillings 
4. CG claims on central government in shillings 
5. CR commercial bank credit to the private sector in shillings 
5. DC domestic claims in shillings 
6. DDR demand deposits rate 
7. DT  total deposit in the banking system in shillings 
8. EDS external debt service in US$ 
9. FER gross foreign exchange reserves in US$  
10. ER exchange rate end of period (Shs/US$) 
11. GB stock of government Treasury bond in shillings 
12. GT government treasury bills in shillings 
13. IR interbank rate in percent 
14. M imports of goods and services FOB in US$ 
15. MB monetary base in shillings 
16. MN nominal money supply shillings 
17. NEQ net equity (shares and other equity) in shillings 
18. NFA net foreign assets in shillings 
19.  NX net exports in US$ 
20. P consumer price index (CPI core base: 2009/10=100) 
21. TB 91 day Treasury bill yield in percent 
22. TDR time deposit rate in percent 
23. R real interest rate in percent 
24. RR rediscount Rate in percent 
25. RN nominal interest rate in percent 
26. SR savings rate in percent 
27. V velocity of money 
28. VC velocity of credit 
29. X exports of goods and services FOB in US$ 
30. Y gross domestic product (GDP) in shillings at constant 2009/10 prices 
Data Source: Bank of Uganda. Data collected were monthly data for the period January 2008 to 
December 2017. 
 
Table 2 lists variables (VARs) used in analysis along with their mean, 
standard deviation and order of integration (O.I.) determined in each test 
by the calculated Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic (CA.T.) in 
comparison with the critical ADF test (CR.T.) at 1 percent level of 
significance (i.e. MacKinnon critical value for rejection of hypothesis of 
rejection). The calculated ADF after dividing the variable by Y are denoted 
as CA.N with the aim of stabilize such variables. As can be observed from 
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Table 2. List of Variables with their Means, Standard Deviations and Order of Integration 
#   VARs Mean S.D. CR.T. CA.T. O.I. CA.N. O.I. 
1 ATB 14.23 4.17  -3.49  -4.28 I(1) -4.43 I(1) 
2 BD 3.05× 1012 1.04× 1012  -3.49  -5.93 I(1) -6.40  I(1) 
3 CC  4.48× 1012 2.16× 1012  -3.49  -5.94 I(1) -6.63 I(1) 
4 CG 7.43× 1012 2.40× 1012  -3.49  -6.18 I(1) -6.19 I(1) 
5 CR 7.48× 1012 2.95× 1012  -3.49  -6.84 I(2) -7.10 I(1) 
5 DC 8.48× 1012 4.29× 1012  -3.49  -3.79 I(1) -6.58 I(1) 
6 DDR 1.52 0.30  -3.49  -4.64 I(1) -4.90 I(1) 
7 DT  6.59× 1012 2.33× 1012  -3.49  -4.57 I(1) -8.10 I(1) 
8 EDS 7.29× 106 6.71× 106  -3.49  -12.0 I(1) -11.9 I(1) 
9 FER  7.48× 1012  7.48× 1012  -3.49  -4.74 I(1) -5.98 I(1) 
10 ER 2650.74 599.49  -3.49  -5.24 I(1) -7.13 I(1) 
11 GB 2.47× 1012 9.91× 1011  -3.49  -3.73 I(1) -5.01 I(1) 
12 GT 1.14× 1010 4.54× 109  -3.49  -3.90 I(1) -4.14 I(1) 
13 IR 10.26 4.82  -3.49  -5.96 I(1) -5.96 I(1) 
14 M 3.42× 108 5.34× 107  -3.49  -7.34 I(1) -6.31 I(1) 
15 MB  3.41× 1012  1.16× 1012  -3.49  -5.87 I(1) -6.11 I(1) 
16 MN  8.73× 1012  3.06× 1012  -3.49  -4.94 I(1) -8.45 I(1) 
17 NEQ  4.48× 1012  2.16× 1012  -3.49  -4.77 I(1) -5.46 I(1) 
18 NFA 8.00× 1012 2.43× 1012  -3.49  -5.72 I(1) -6.69 I(1) 
19 NX -1.71 × 108 4.61× 107  -3.49  -6.89 I(1) -6.60 I(1) 
20 P 127.42 24.87  -3.49  -5.93 I(2) -8.47 I(1) 
21 R 14.42 4.71 -3.49 -5.16 I(1) -5.14 I(1) 
22 RN 22.22 2.11 -3.49 -5.19 I(1) -6.69 I(1) 
23 RR 15.42 4.65 -3.49 -4.08 I(1) -4.49 I(1) 
24 TB  2.47× 1012  9.97× 1011  -3.49  -3.73 I(2) -5.01 I(1) 
25 TDR 11.69 3.26  -3.49  -4.42 I(1) -4.40 I(1) 
26 SR 2.84 0.52  -3.49 -5.68 I(1) -5.59 I(1) 
27 V 188.67 15.99  -3.49  -3.51 I(0) -4.35 I(1) 
28 VC 78.22 34.32  -3.49  -6.69 I(1) -8.02 I(1) 
29 X  2.21× 108  3.36× 107  -3.49  -7.15 I(1) -7.15 I(1) 
30 Y  1.24× 1013  1.83× 1012  -3.49  -9.08 I(1) -8.10 I(1) 
 
Table 3, Appendix 1 represents the values of correlation coefficients for 
the variables listed in Table 1. The relationship between bank credit and 
each of other variables is represented by the respective correlation 
coefficient as follows: nominal interest rate (0.35), real interest rate (0.61), 
CPI (0.99), exchange rate (0.96), money supply (0.99), real GDP (0.93), 
income velocity of money (-0.45), time deposit rate (0.22), rediscount rate 
(0.35), exports (0.75), imports (0,48), external debt service (0.41), net foreign 
assets (0.95), government treasury bill (0.50), government bonds (0.92), net 
exports (-0.01), demand deposit ratio (0.63), savings ratio (0.74), interbank 
rate (0.30), domestic credit (0.99), bank deposits (0.97), claims on 
government (0.49), total deposits in the banking system (0.98), currency in 
circulation (0.99), monetary base (0.99), treasury bill (0.92), net equity (0.98).  
Our correlation matrix shows very high correlation between some of the 
variables implying that probably there is transmission of monetary policy 
signals through some of the variables. But correlation does not necessarily 
mean causation (Mishkin, 2010, p.606). To examine whether the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism could have been transmitted through the 
bank credit in Uganda during the sample period, the Granger causality 
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tests are conducted. Only the causality between bank credit and each of the 
other variables is reported (see Appendix 2, Table 4). 
Changes in bank credits may entail significant changes in real output 
and inflation. Granger causality tests have been conducted, to examine the 
causality between variables, in particular the relationships between bank 
credits and selected monetary, financial and real sector indicators. Using 
two lags, results of the Granger causality tests on data set from January 
2008 to December 2017 reveal that at 10% level of significance bank credit 
Granger caused the following variables: currency in circulation, external 
debt service, nominal exchange rate, Government bonds, Treasury bonds, 
monetary base, net foreign assets, nominal interest rate, savings rate, 
exports, real income (GDP), reserves, and velocity of money in the deposits 
market. These aforementioned variables existing in the economy of Uganda 
therefore were part of the economic interactions. 
Secondly, the causality between bank credit and the selected variables 
show that variables that Granger caused bank credit in Uganda during the 
sample period were as follows: bank deposits, total deposits in the banking 
system, imports, money supply, time deposits rate, velocity of money, 
velocity of money in the bank credit market and money multiplier. Thirdly, 
the causality tests show that there is a bidirectional causality between bank 
credit and each of the following selected variables: annual Treasury bill, 
domestic credit, net equity, consumer price index (CPI), real interest rate, 
rediscount rate, and velocity of money in the bank credit market.  
Fourthly, at 10% level of significance the monetary policy transmission 
is found to have operated as follows: from real interest rate (𝑅), to money 
supply (𝑀𝑛),  to bank deposits (𝐵𝐷),  to bank credit (𝐶𝑅) , to CPI (𝑃),  to 
GDP (𝑌) and to nominal exchange rate (𝐸𝑅). Symbolically the monetary 
transmission mechanism is found to have operated as follows: 
 
𝑅 → 𝑀𝑛 → 𝐵𝐷 → 𝐶𝑅 ↔ 𝑃 → 𝑌 ↔ 𝐸𝑅 
 
However, one feedback loop is found to run from bank credit back to 
real interest rate, four feedback loops is found to run from CPI back to real 
interest rate, money supply, bank deposits and bank credit, one feedback 
bidirectional loop is found to run from CPI back to bank deposits, one 
feedback loop is found to run from GDP back to real interest rate, and two 
feedback loops is found to run from nominal exchange rate to CPI and real 
interest rate.  
 
5. Empirical results and discussion 
5.1. Objectives and scheme of evaluation (Assessment) 
The main objectives of this section are to (a) test the bank credit channel 
of monetary policy and (b) test the determinants of bank credit in Uganda. 
The section addresses the following questions: 
(a) Does monetary policy affect inflation through the credit channel? 
(b) How important are the different transmission channels? 
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(c) Does the relative importance of these channels depend on whether 
the borrowers are households or firms?  
(d) What are the determinants of bank credit in Uganda? 
The study is important because in Uganda the empirical evidence on 
bank credit is still scanty. The transmission of monetary policy through the 
interest rate and exchange rate channels that have become pronounced in 
Uganda during the inflation targeting regime and the bank credit channel 
matters in transmission of impulses to the real economy. 
Evaluation of MPTM considered are conducted in five steps as follows: 
(a) Imposing the monetary policy route into the model formed. 
(b) Solving the model using the solution algorithms by Granger 
causality technique. 
(c) Observing the property of stochastic steady state (stationarity) 
distribution of variables.  
(d) Choosing the route that gives the most stationary performance in 
particular with regression results. 
(e) Checking the results for robustness using other models (Taylor, 
2002). 
Timelessness is a very important approach used in evaluating the 
MPTM. By focusing on stationarity distribution, ensures that the policy rule 
is not different from one that follows under the same conditions at any 
other time (McCallum, 1999). 
This section provides a quantitative assessment of bank credit channel of 
monetary policy of Uganda. The regression results obtained are out of the 
dynamic economy wide models because monetary policy has effect on 
entire economy. The dynamic models used take into account the fact that 
there are lags in the monetary policy transmission mechanism (MPTM) and 
expectations of the future are important in financial markets. According to 
Bayangos (2010), initiatives to analyze the interaction between credit and 
monetary policy include studies by Bernanke et al. (1999), Carlstrom & 
Fuerst (2001), Iacoviello (2005) and Van den Heuvel (2002).  
There are two broad strategies of empirical studies on the importance of 
bank lending or credit channel of MPTM. The first strategy is based on 
aggregate data. It is concerned with examining the reaction of bank loans, 
deposits and bonds to monetary policy shocks, using impulse response 
functions from a vector autoregression (VAR) model and reduced form 
methods. But this strategy does not allow for the quantitative identification 
of supply and demand effects on credit growth. Thus, the evidences found 
using the first technique in principle are treated as indicative only. The 
second strategy employs bank level data. This strategy attempts to identify 
shifts in loan supply from shifts in loan demand. The identification is done 
with the assumption that certain bank characteristics determine the degree 
to which banks respond to monetary policy shocks. “Most studies specify 
loan growth for each bank as a function of its lagged values, aggregate 
variables (GDP growth, short–term interest rate change, and inflation) and 
bank specific characteristics. 
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However, in most studies, this strategy does not address the issue that 
the change in monetary policy may not be exogenous, which makes it hard 
to identify the true effect of higher interest rates on loan supply.” 
(Bayangos, 2010). The strategy of our empirical analysis is to estimate the 
quantitative importance of credit at the macroeconomic level that includes 
the relevant macroeconomic variables. Such approach provides a better 
insight into the relevant quantitative effect of changes in bank credit in 
Uganda. By using the generalized least squares method the paper is able to 
trace the effect of macroeconomic linkages in Uganda from 2008:1 to 
2017:12.  
 
5.2. The bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (MPTM) 
Each of the 38 regression equations is assessed for basic diagnostic tests. 
The signs and magnitudes of individual coefficients in each equation, such 
as t statistic, the adjusted R–Squared (𝑅2), Durbin Watson(𝐷𝑊), Koenker–
Basset heteroscedasticity t statistic (𝐻𝑇) and F statistic are all examined. All 
calculated t and F values are higher than the critical values, at the 5% level 
of significance, thereby indicating that all the parameters are significantly 
different from zero and there is a significant degree of reliability of 
coefficients of determination as well as absence of heteroscedasticiy. The 
heteroscedasticity t statistic indicates that each of the repressions has 
constant variance. The Durbin–Watson test for serial correlation show that 
all regression results do not suffer from autocorrelation. 
5.2.1. Bank credit is created out of bank deposits 
The paper finds that bank credit is not created out of nothing but bank 
deposits. This finding is supported by Equations A1, A10, A13, A14, A19, 
A20, A21, A22, A28, A30 and A33 in Appendix 3 where in the current 
month reduction in bank deposits by 1% might have caused bank credit to 
increase within the range of 0.12% to 0.40% during the sample period, 
ceteris paribus. A month later the credit that has been created is then 
remitted into the deposits system as savings. That is why regression of 
bank credit on the lag of bank deposits provides a positive coefficient.  
Recall, commercial banks create money, by making new loans out of 
bank deposits. For instance, when a bank makes a loan to its customer as a 
mortgage to buy a house, in principle it does not give them thousands of 
banknotes. Rather, it credits the bank account of the customer with a bank 
deposit of the size of the mortgage, and instantly a new money is created. 
Thus deposits are typically created by the saving decisions of households, 
and banks then ‘lend out’ those existing deposits to borrowers. What 
households save in bank accounts are deposits that come simply at the 
expense of deposits that would have otherwise gone to companies in 
payment for goods and services. Savings raise the deposits or funds 
available for banks to lend. Similarly, according to coefficients in Equations 
A1 (i.e. -0.42) and A2 (i.e. 0.39), money that leaks out of the monetary base 
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as deposits in the current month comes back to increase the monetary base 
in form of savings. 
 
5.2. Monetary policy transmission mechanism operates through 
the bank credit channel 
At the end of section 4 of this present paper the Granger causality tests 
conducted shows that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in 
Uganda during the sample period was procyclycle. One of the key 
variables responsible involved in the MPTM is inflation that might have 
caused quantity of bank credit to increase probably by making products of 
firms more profitable. 
A 1% increase in inflation might have caused growth in bank credit to 
increase within the range of 0.508% to 0.853% within one month as 
depicted by Equations A4, A5, A10, A14, A16, A21, A22, A23, A24, A25, 
and A28 in Appendix 3. As a result, the finding confirms the presence of 
MPTM in Uganda during the sample period. These findings concur with 
monetary Authorities assumption that policy actions are transmitted to 
market interest rates instantaneously, symmetrically and in a linear 
fashion; in our case within one or two months only. It should be noted that 
the range is close to the explicit inflation target that BOU set at 5 percent 
per annum. 
Before October 2009, the Bank of Uganda (BOU) adhered closely to its 
money targets. Shocks to money demand thus generated substantial 
movements in interbank rates that did not signal policy intentions and 
which were often temporary and, as a result, had little effect on lending 
rates or other aspects of the transmission mechanism. Since October 2009 
the BOU has allowed for more flexibility in daily money market operations 
in order to smooth short term money market rates. This immediately has 
reduced the volatility of interbank rates (Berg et al., 2013).  
Uganda is classified as a floating regime. The monetary authorities 
intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to maintain stability in 
the foreign exchange market. Since 2010, the Bank of Uganda (BOU) has 
been conducting daily purchases for reserve buildup purposes. The BOU 
engages in targeted sales occasionally as deemed necessary and there are 
no capital controls. Furthermore, the BOU publishes information on its 
interventions in its monthly, quarterly and annual reports, including the 
amounts purchased or sold through the reserve buildup program and 
through targeted transactions. 
More importantly, the findings support Berg et al. (2013) claim that the 
transmission mechanism in the economy of Uganda is alive and well: after 
a large policy–induced rise in the short–term interest rate, lending and 
other interest rates rise. As a result, the exchange rate tends to appreciate, 
output tends to fall, and inflation declines. The finding gives the clearest 
transmission in Uganda, where the Inflation Targeting (IT) lite regime itself 
is simpler and more transparent. The explicit inflation target is set at 5 
percent. The recent evolution of Uganda’s monetary policy regime shows 
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generally that the transmission mechanism depends on the policy 
framework itself and on the operational procedures of monetary policy 
implementation.  
Secondly, the result in Equation A22 Appendix 3 shows that MPTM was 
transmitted from the 91–day Treasury bill (TB) through the bank credit 
channel because a 1% decrease in the TB growth is associated with growth 
in bank credit by 0.064% per month during the sampling period, ceteris 
paribus. On the other hand By using micro–level data Opolot et al., (2013) 
finds that in a two–step GMM estimation, the corresponding effect of a one 
percentage point increase in the BOU 91–day Treasury bill rate is a decline 
in bank loan supply by 0.098 percentage points in Uganda. The central 
bank usually responds to inflation by tightening the monetary policy 
stance, and affect the commercial banks loan supply function with a lag. It 
is this monetary policy variable that affects the banks’ loan supply with a 
lag, and releases some impulse in the transmission mechanism. 
In July 2011 the BOU announced and officially launched the inflation 
targeting lite (IT–lite) regime and introduced the Central Bank Rate (CBR) 
to target the interbank rate a move away from monetary targeting. These 
changes to the policy framework and operations set the stage for changes in 
short term interest rates (specifically the CBR) to have a larger impact on 
the economy. Under the new regime, an interest rate is the operating target 
of monetary policy called the Central Bank Rate (CBR). The CBR is set once 
a month and used to guide 7 day interbank interest rates along with the 
rediscount policy used often used by the BOU to signal policy (Berg et al., 
2013). 
Thirdly, according to result in Equation A26 Appendix 3, a 1 percent 
decline in the 7-day interbank interest rates (IR) is followed by 0.038 
percent growth per month on average, ceteris paribus. In practice when the 
Bank of Uganda simultaneously switched to an IT–lite monetary policy 
framework, the tightening phase started in July 2011. Thus, the BOU 
introduced a policy rate, and stepped up its communication efforts to 
enhance the credibility of the new framework. In the second half of 2011 
the BOU decided to tighten monetary policy with the intention of fighting 
inflation. A negative commodity price shock began during 2010–2011, with 
food and fuel prices rising substantially. Coupled with strong credit 
growth, a weakening currency and low real interest rates, the shock led to 
soaring inflation (Abuka et al., 2015). 
In mid–2011 the Bank of Uganda raised the policy rate by a cumulative 
1,000 basis points (bps) over the course of five months. In the following 
eleven months BOU reduced it by a total of 1,100 bps. These changes 
occurred over relatively short period of time. Consequently, it reduces the 
likelihood that structural transformation of the economy might respond to 
an analysis of the effectiveness of monetary policy. For instance, following 
the tightening, credit growth collapsed to negative levels by the second half 
of 2012 (Abuka et al., 2015). Like Abuka et al. (2015) this present paper finds 
a strong balance sheet channel for the transmission of monetary policy.  
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Nevertheless, the expansionary phase of credit began in January 2012 
when the policy rate was gradually reduced over the following three 
quarters from 23 percent to 11 percent. The average marginal lending rate 
on local currency loans increased during the tightening period from close 
to 15 percent to almost 25 percent and subsequently returned to about 20 
percent (Abuka et al., 2015). 
Fourthly, the degree to which a 1% growth in each of the various 
variables was causing growth in bank credit in Uganda during the sample 
period, holding other things constant is presented in Table 3 that lists 
various effects of other variables on bank credit. All the signs on the 
coefficients conform to theories regarding the relationships between the 
bank credit and the individual variables. Thus, all the variables that 
contributes to yields on credit (ATB, R, Rn, RR, IR and TDR) have negative 
influence on bank credit.  
In a nut shell variables that have positive contributions on bank credit 
are: claims on central government, demand for money, deposits within the 
banking system, domestic credit, exchange rate, exports, government bond, 
monetary base, money supply, net equity, net foreign assets, real gross 
domestic product, savings rate treasury bonds, velocity of money in the 
entire economy and velocity of money in the credit market. Meanwhile the 
variables that have negative effects on bank credit are: annual Treasury bill, 
currency in circulation, Demand deposits ratio, external debt servicing, 
imports, nominal interest rate, real interest rate, rediscount rate, reserves, 
and time deposits rate. These findings suggest that the credit, exchange 
rate, bank credit, interest rates, equity price, expectations and wealth effects 
channels are interlinked. Besides the MPTM is invigorated when banks 
react to policies set by the monetary authorities. For instance, in 2010 when 
BOU raised its bank rate from 13% to 23%, banks raised their prime lending 
rates to the range of 18% to 34% (Nakayiza, 2013). 
 
Table 3. List of other Variables along with the Degree of their Influence on Bank Credit 
(i) Annual Treasury bill (𝐴𝑇𝐵) -0.042% (Equation A16). 
(ii) Claims on central government (𝐶𝐺) 0.119% to 0.120% (Equation A17, A26). 
(iii) Currency in circulation(𝐶𝐶)  -0.254% (Equation A9).     
(iv) Demand deposits ratio (𝐷𝐷𝑅) -0.030% (Equation 20). 
(v) Demand for money (𝑀𝑑) 0.239% (Equation A4).   
(vi) Deposits within the banking system 0.688% (𝐷𝑡) (Equation A1). 
(vii) Domestic credit (𝐷𝐶) 0.228 (Equation A17). 
(viii) Exchange rate (𝐸𝑅) 0.142% to 0.77% (Equations A9, A13, A14, A16, A20, A24-A26, A28). 
(ix) Exports 0.073 (Equation A18).      
(x) External debt servicing (𝐸𝐷𝑆) -0.015% (Equation A27). 
(xi) Government bond  (𝐺𝑏) 0.146% (Equation A26).     
(xii) Imports (𝑀) -0.082 (Equation A18).    
(xiii) Investment Spending (𝐼) 0.258% (Equation A4). 
(xiv) Monetary base (𝑀𝑏) 0.329% (Equation A6).      
(xv) Money supply (𝑀𝑛) 0.317% to 0.722% (Equations A14, A16, A17, A20, A23, A25). 
(xvi) Net equity (𝑁𝐸𝑄) 0.073% (Equation 22).     
(xvii) Net foreign assets (𝑁𝐹𝐴) 0.657% (Equation A27). 
(xviii) Nominal interest rate (𝑅𝑛) -0.394% (Equation 23). 
(xix) Real gross domestic product (𝑌) 0.124% to 0.218% (Equations A13, A14, A19, A28). 
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(xx) Real interest rate (𝑅) -0.028% to -0.45% (Equations A5, A13, A16, A19, A21, 24, A28). 
(xxi) Rediscount rate (𝑅𝑅) -0.069% (Equation 25). 
(xxii) Reserves (𝑅𝑒) -0.047% (Equation A6). 
(xxiii) Savings rate (𝑆𝑟) 0.039% to 0.069% (Equations A9, A17, A20, A26).  
(xxiv) Time deposit rate (𝑇𝐷𝑅) -0.032% to -0.051% (Equation A14, A20, A24, A25). 
(xxv) Treasury bonds (𝑇𝐵) 0.132% to 0.030% (Equations 17, Equation A26).  
(xxvi) Velocity of money in the entire economy (𝑉) 0.128% to 164% (Equations A12, A15). 
(xxvii) Velocity of money in the credit market (𝑉𝐶𝐿) 0.151 to 0.308% (Equations A1, A15). 
 
5.3. Passing the monetary policy transmission mechanism to 
inflation 
From Equations (A12), (15A) and (A31) it can be deduced that a 1 
percent increase in bank credit, velocity of money in the credit market, 
income velocity of money, bank deposits, interbank rate and output in the 
previous period growth was responsible for 0.58%, 0.14% to 0.15%, 0.13% 
to 0.19%, 0.03% to 0.08% and -0.02% and 0.06% increase respectively in 
inflation during the sample period, other things being constant. Thus 
implying that the MPTM was in existence. 
 
5.4. Wealth effects channel of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism  
Equation (A29) and (A11) satisfy liquidity preference theory which says 
that (a) as interest rates increase, real money balance declines, leading 
velocity to rise. The results in Equations (A29) and (A11) show that a 1 
percent rise in growth of bank credit, velocity of money, price  level and 
interest rate growth is found to have been associated with 0.21%, 0.75% to 
1.09%, -0.77% and -0.10% rise respectively in economic growth during the 
sample period, ceteris paribus.  
Meanwhile, Equations (30) shows that a 1 percent increase in bank 
deposits, exchange rate and interest growth is found to have been the cause 
of growth in equity by -0.22%, 1.22% and 0.44% respectively during the 
sample period, ceteris paribus.  Hence, indicating that the wealth channel 
of monetary poicy transmission mechanism PTM was operational in the 
economy of Uganda within the given period. Moreover, from Equation 
(38A) it is clear that raising output and exchange rate causes reduction in 
balance of payments deterioration. Meanwhile increasing interest rate, 
bank credit and bank deposits promote balance of payments problem, 
probably due to huge imports bills incurred in importation of machinery 
and equipment. 
 
5.5. Exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism   
Empirical Results in Equation (A34) show that a 1% growth in money 
supply in the previous period, real interest rate, net equity, price level, 
government bonds, and exports in the previous period is associated with 
0.14%, 0.03%, 0.19%, 0.84, -0.08% and -0.05% increase respectively in 
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exchange rate depreciation. Thus the exchange rate channel of MPTM 
exists, though causality runs from exchange rate to prices. 
 
5.6. Fiscal channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism  
It can be discerned from Empirical Results in Equation (A33) that a 1% 
rise in growth of demand for: bank credit in the previous period, bank 
deposits in the previous period, equity and money supply, and real interest 
rate is associated with 0.30%, -0.26%, 0.43%, 0.13% and -0.89% growth 
respectively in demand for government bond during the sample period. 
Thus, there could have been in existence the fiscal monetary policy 
mechanism in Uganda between 2008:1 and 2017:12. 
 
5.7. Interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism  
From Equations (A32) and (A35) it can be deduced that increases in 
interest growth by -6.52% to -5.02%, 2.91%, 0.60%, 3.21%, 1.17%, 1.51% and 
-0.34%; could have been caused by increase in growth of money supply in 
the previous period, real income, net exports, nominal exchange rate, 
government bond, total deposits in the banking system, and rediscount rate 
respectively are associated with 1% increase in interest rate, during the 
sample period, ceteris paribus. The implication of these results is that 
inflation targeting lite might be preventing wild growth in rate interest rate 
by greatly reducing money supply growth. 
 
5.8. Money rate channel of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism  
It is clear from Equations (A7), (A8) and (A36) that increases in money 
supply growth by 0.30% to 0.75%, 0.31% to 0.18%, 0.60%, -0.12%, and 
0.15%; might have been caused by increase in growth of bank credit, bank 
deposit, level of prices in the previous, velocity of money and are 
associated with 1% increase in money supply, during the sample period, 
ceteris paribus. The implication of these results is that inflation targeting 
lite might enabled the BOU to make money supply growth be in line with 
movements in the inflation rate. Equations (A2) and (A3) indicate that a 1% 
growth in bank credit, bank deposit in the current period and bank deposit 
in the previous period could have been responsible for 0.24% to 0.35%, -
0.42% and 0,39% growth respectively in the monetary base during the 
sample period, ceteris paribus. 
This finding shows that when deposits are created, they are first 
extracted from the monetary system in the first month and then after one 
month included in the monetary system. Granger causality test indicates 
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This paper examines the transmission mechanism of monetary policy by 
testing the existence of various channels of the MPTM with respect to the 
bank credit channel. This paper undertakes a dynamic, structural, economy 
wide macro econometric model of Uganda from 2008:1 to 2017:12 to 
particularly examine the bank credit channel of monetary policy in 
Uganda. The paper attempts to build models to situate the bank credit into 
the monetary model as an endogenous variable with diverse effects on the 
macro economy. Evidence on bank lending channel is obtained by 
estimating a credit behavior along with its interactions with other monetary 
and macroeconomic variables. The major task of the paper is to examine 
the MPTM channels and determine whether bank credit matters in 
transmitting impulses to the real economy in the Uganda.  
Each of the separate links in the bank credit transmission mechanism is 
examined in more detail, by using separate regression equations by using a 
simple but more accurate econometric technique, a new GLS tool. The 
results from the macro model suggest that bank credit channel plays a role 
in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Uganda. The Granger 
causality results indicate feedback loop from real output to bank credit.  
These findings have important implications for monetary policy as it 
revisits the connection between monetary policy and stability in the 
banking sector. In particular, one crucial issue to note regarding use of IT in 
central banks, is whether an IT framework could be a reasonable option. 
Although banking stability is not a primary objective for central banks, 
central banks may benefit from the awareness of risks posed to banking 
stability. Thus, there is a need for monitoring banking stability in general 
and the degree of bank capitalization in particular from a better monetary 
policy framework in order to better assess the transmission of monetary 
impulses.  
Therefore, central banks should be concerned about how bank credit 
relates to the broader issue of the relationship between monetary and 
financial stability. Thus, there is need for central banks to combine 
monetary and regulatory policies into a macro financial stability 
framework. So that the first primary suggestion would be to focus on 
systemic developments. The second one would be to build closer 
cooperation between monetary authorities and financial regulators in 
assessing the buildup of systemic risks and in deciding what to do to 
mitigate them. The third one would be a much more counter–cyclical way 
for conducting both monetary and regulatory policies, one that would use 
both instruments to lean in a systematic way against credit excesses in the 
upswing of the cycle (White, 2009).  
More specifically, monetary policy would control the growth of credit 
(and asset prices), particularly if accompanied by unusual spending 
patterns that would open up a real risk of subsequent reversal. Such efforts 
to combine monetary and supervision policy would need to be done 
broadly. This all–encompassing scale is important because attempts to 
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reduce risk in one sector of the financial system (for example, the banking 













































Journal of Economics and Political Economy 











Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix 
 CR RN R P ER MN Y 
CR 1.0000 0.3500 0.6108 0.9897 0.9625 0.9850 0.9339 
RN 0.3500 1.0000 0.1373 0.4063 0.2915 0.2439 0.2490 
R 0.6108 0.1373 1.0000 0.6143 0.5199 0.6197 0.5998 
P 0.9897 0.4063 0.6143 1.0000 0.9361 0.9741 0.9269 
ER 0.9625 0.2915 0.5199 0.9361 1.0000 0.9531 0.8946 
MN 0.9850 0.2439 0.6197 0.9741 0.9531 1.0000 0.9417 
Y 0.9339 0.2490 0.5998 0.9269 0.8946 0.9417 1.0000 
V -0.4467 0.0972 -0.3444 -0.3998 -0.4574 -0.5045 -0.2794 
VC 0.9915 0.3872 0.6009 0.9870 0.9526 0.9699 0.8843 
TDR 0.2176 0.8160 -0.2167 0.2519 0.1673 0.1063 0.1364 
ATB 0.2948 0.6282 -0.2505 0.2891 0.2935 0.1710 0.1647 
RR 0.3545 0.7589 -0.1976 0.3716 0.3160 0.2458 0.2334 
X 0.7517 0.3199 0.4415 0.7815 0.7064 0.7695 0.7626 
M 0.4789 0.3214 0.2287 0.4930 0.3829 0.4835 0.4091 
EDS 0.4059 -0.0401 0.2275 0.4114 0.3947 0.4354 0.3705 
NFA 0.9451 0.2241 0.6195 0.9404 0.9433 0.9615 0.9052 
GT 0.4962 0.7031 -0.1179 0.4869 0.4799 0.3887 0.3682 
GB 0.9239 0.3179 0.6613 0.9241 0.8728 0.9023 0.8742 
NX -0.0080 -0.1397 0.0563 -0.0027 0.0703 -0.0004 0.0808 
DDR 0.6327 0.2481 0.6069 0.6667 0.5340 0.6216 0.5905 
SR 0.7427 0.4827 0.5236 0.7417 0.7174 0.6955 0.6711 
IR 0.2987 0.6858 -0.3027 0.3137 0.2714 0.2033 0.1831 
DC 0.9916 0.2911 0.5750 0.9712 0.9701 0.9855 0.9281 
BD 0.9719 0.1956 0.6466 0.9618 0.9312 0.9940 0.9424 
CG 0.4861 0.4480 0.4464 0.5564 0.3356 0.4732 0.4561 
DT 0.9800 0.2303 0.6306 0.9707 0.9452 0.9989 0.9415 
CC 0.9856 0.2724 0.5802 0.9688 0.9626 0.9894 0.9312 
MB 0.9864 0.2662 0.6012 0.9693 0.9585 0.9884 0.9371 
TB 0.9239 0.3179 0.6613 0.9241 0.8728 0.9023 0.8742 
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Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 V VC TDR ATB RR X M 
CR -0.4467 0.9915 0.2176 0.2948 0.3545 0.7517 0.4789 
RN 0.0972 0.3872 0.8160 0.6282 0.7589 0.3199 0.3214 
R -0.3444 0.6009 -0.2167 -0.2505 -0.1976 0.4415 0.2287 
P -0.3998 0.9870 0.2519 0.2891 0.3716 0.7815 0.4930 
ER -0.4574 0.9526 0.1673 0.2935 0.3160 0.7064 0.3829 
MN -0.5045 0.9699 0.1063 0.1710 0.2458 0.7695 0.4835 
Y -0.2794 0.8843 0.1364 0.1647 0.2334 0.7626 0.4091 
V 1.0000 -0.4669 0.1920 0.1701 0.1168 -0.1902 -0.4482 
VC -0.4669 1.0000 0.2436 0.3233 0.3869 0.7363 0.4863 
TDR 0.1920 0.2436 1.0000 0.8254 0.8993 0.1879 0.2908 
ATB 0.1701 0.3233 0.8254 1.0000 0.8808 0.1139 0.1409 
RR 0.1168 0.3869 0.8993 0.8808 1.0000 0.2721 0.3242 
X -0.1902 0.7363 0.1879 0.1139 0.2721 1.0000 0.5178 
M -0.4482 0.4863 0.2908 0.1409 0.3242 0.5178 1.0000 
EDS -0.2021 0.4136 -0.0848 -0.0476 0.0259 0.3508 0.2218 
NFA -0.3855 0.9356 0.0673 0.1362 0.2122 0.8016 0.4000 
GT -0.0525 0.5165 0.8579 0.9149 0.9261 0.2821 0.3181 
GB -0.2455 0.9189 0.1599 0.2743 0.3075 0.7211 0.3137 
NX 0.3811 -0.0278 -0.2003 -0.0804 -0.1778 0.1277 -0.7824 
DDR -0.1647 0.6467 0.0633 0.0880 0.1680 0.4702 0.2060 
SR -0.1651 0.7511 0.3264 0.3263 0.4187 0.5896 0.3388 
IR 0.0531 0.3279 0.8629 0.8196 0.9035 0.2366 0.3394 
DC -0.4773 0.9797 0.1720 0.2813 0.3257 0.7219 0.4439 
BD -0.4943 0.9531 0.0501 0.1183 0.1942 0.7632 0.4693 
CG -0.3278 0.4965 0.3234 0.0662 0.2691 0.4872 0.6053 
DT -0.5160 0.9639 0.0847 0.1393 0.2222 0.7676 0.4897 
CC -0.4688 0.9720 0.1644 0.2595 0.3048 0.7586 0.4547 
MB -0.4587 0.9709 0.1526 0.2537 0.2949 0.7446 0.4486 
TB -0.2455 0.9189 0.1599 0.2743 0.3075 0.7211 0.3137 
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Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 EDS NFA GT GB NX DDR SR 
CR 0.40586 0.94505 0.49615 0.92391 -0.00799 0.63270 0.74268 
RN -0.04015 0.22415 0.70306 0.31786 -0.13974 0.24806 0.48274 
R 0.22745 0.61950 -0.11790 0.66133 0.05626 0.60690 0.52356 
P 0.41145 0.94043 0.48686 0.92407 -0.00268 0.66669 0.74174 
ER 0.39470 0.94327 0.47989 0.87279 0.07032 0.53405 0.71742 
MN 0.43541 0.96148 0.38867 0.90232 -0.00037 0.62161 0.69551 
Y 0.37049 0.90524 0.36821 0.87418 0.08082 0.59053 0.67111 
V -0.20208 -0.38554 -0.05249 -0.24554 0.38114 -0.16472 -0.16515 
VC 0.41364 0.93557 0.51650 0.91895 -0.02778 0.64669 0.75110 
TDR -0.08484 0.06729 0.85786 0.15994 -0.20027 0.06330 0.32638 
ATB -0.04763 0.13623 0.91492 0.27429 -0.08039 0.08802 0.32629 
RR 0.02591 0.21219 0.92614 0.30746 -0.17781 0.16799 0.41865 
X 0.35085 0.80164 0.28210 0.72115 0.12767 0.47022 0.58962 
M 0.22182 0.39997 0.31808 0.31365 -0.78242 0.20602 0.33877 
EDS 1.00000 0.45683 0.03889 0.36904 -0.00177 0.30331 0.21888 
NFA 0.45683 1.00000 0.31423 0.90176 0.11984 0.59734 0.70627 
GT 0.03889 0.31423 1.00000 0.40773 -0.16341 0.17005 0.46962 
GB 0.36904 0.90176 0.40773 1.00000 0.16131 0.76977 0.72541 
NX -0.00177 0.11984 -0.16341 0.16131 1.00000 0.10344 0.03646 
DDR 0.30331 0.59734 0.17005 0.76977 0.10344 1.00000 0.54574 
SR 0.21888 0.70627 0.46962 0.72541 0.03646 0.54574 1.00000 
IR 0.02001 0.14783 0.87387 0.22703 -0.22127 0.08109 0.33902 
DC 0.41233 0.93532 0.48505 0.91625 0.01083 0.61927 0.71875 
BD 0.44622 0.95619 0.32750 0.90251 0.01156 0.64280 0.67498 
CG 0.11799 0.39972 0.23601 0.39618 -0.34710 0.48650 0.36549 
DT 0.44013 0.95766 0.36330 0.89595 -0.00892 0.62630 0.68570 
CC 0.41597 0.95680 0.45591 0.90499 0.02503 0.59326 0.71026 
MB 0.41672 0.95252 0.44529 0.91020 0.02200 0.60686 0.71796 
TB 0.36904 0.90176 0.40773 1.00000 0.16131 0.76977 0.72541 
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Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 IR DC BD CG DT CC MB TB NEQ 
CR 0.2987 0.9916 0.9719 0.4861 0.9800 0.9856 0.9864 0.9239 0.9795 
RN 0.6858 0.2911 0.1956 0.4480 0.2303 0.2724 0.2662 0.3179 0.2746 
R -0.3027 0.5750 0.6466 0.4464 0.6306 0.5802 0.6012 0.6613 0.5867 
P 0.3137 0.9712 0.9618 0.5564 0.9707 0.9688 0.9693 0.9241 0.9571 
ER 0.2714 0.9701 0.9312 0.3356 0.9452 0.9626 0.9585 0.8728 0.9860 
MN 0.2033 0.9855 0.9940 0.4732 0.9989 0.9894 0.9884 0.9023 0.9696 
Y 0.1831 0.9281 0.9424 0.4561 0.9415 0.9312 0.9371 0.8742 0.9186 
V 0.0531 -0.477 -0.494 -0.328 -0.516 -0.469 -0.459 -0.246 -0.416 
VC 0.3279 0.9797 0.9531 0.4965 0.9639 0.9720 0.9709 0.9189 0.9686 
TDR 0.8629 0.1720 0.0501 0.3234 0.0847 0.1644 0.1526 0.1599 0.1386 
ATB 0.8196 0.2813 0.1183 0.0662 0.1393 0.2595 0.2537 0.2743 0.2721 
RR 0.9035 0.3257 0.1942 0.2691 0.2222 0.3048 0.2949 0.3075 0.2928 
X 0.2366 0.7219 0.7632 0.4872 0.7676 0.7586 0.7446 0.7211 0.7209 
M 0.3394 0.4439 0.4693 0.6053 0.4897 0.4547 0.4486 0.3137 0.3711 
EDS 0.0200 0.4123 0.4462 0.1180 0.4401 0.4160 0.4167 0.3690 0.4086 
NFA 0.1478 0.9353 0.9562 0.3997 0.9577 0.9568 0.9525 0.9018 0.9575 
GT 0.8739 0.4850 0.3275 0.2360 0.3633 0.4559 0.4453 0.4077 0.4499 
GB 0.2270 0.9162 0.9025 0.3962 0.8960 0.9050 0.9102 1.0000 0.9215 
NX -0.2213 0.0108 0.0116 -0.347 -0.009 0.0250 0.0220 0.1613 0.0946 
DDR 0.0811 0.6193 0.6428 0.4865 0.6263 0.5933 0.6069 0.7698 0.6001 
SR 0.3390 0.7188 0.6750 0.3655 0.6857 0.7103 0.7180 0.7254 0.7362 
IR 1.0000 0.2792 0.1492 0.2471 0.1830 0.2547 0.2423 0.2270 0.2324 
DC 0.2792 1.0000 0.9729 0.4136 0.9805 0.9867 0.9875 0.9162 0.9859 
BD 0.1492 0.9729 1.0000 0.4806 0.9955 0.9758 0.9774 0.9025 0.9560 
CG 0.2471 0.4136 0.4806 1.0000 0.4873 0.4206 0.4225 0.3962 0.3434 
DT 0.1830 0.9805 0.9955 0.4873 1.0000 0.9819 0.9818 0.8960 0.9626 
CC 0.2547 0.9867 0.9758 0.4206 0.9819 1.0000 0.9963 0.9050 0.9764 
MB 0.2423 0.9875 0.9774 0.4225 0.9818 0.9963 1.0000 0.9102 0.9774 
TB 0.2270 0.9162 0.9025 0.3962 0.8960 0.9050 0.9102 1.0000 0.9215 
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Table 4. Pairwise Granger Causality Tests with Two Lags 
Causality between Bank Credit (i.e. Lending) and Other Individual Variables 
Sample Period: 2008:01 to 2017:12 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs. F-Statistic Probability 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(ATB) 118 4.39968 0.01445 
  LOG(ATB) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR)   4.63883 0.01158 
  LOG(CR/MN) does not Granger Cause LOG(ATB) 118 7.78786 0.00068 
  LOG(ATB) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR/MN)   2.91386 0.05835 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(BD) 118 0.76948 0.46566 
  LOG(BD) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR)   3.73187 0.02695 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(CC) 118 8.99683 0.00024 
  LOG(CC) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR)   0.08519 0.9184 
  LOG(DC) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 3.34506 0.03878 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(DC)   3.28504 0.04104 
  LOG(DDR) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.10391 0.90139 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(DDR)   1.389 0.25355 
  LOG(DT) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 4.69807 0.01097 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(DT)   0.45708 0.6343 
  LOG(EDS) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.25138 0.77816 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(EDS)   10.0358 9.70E-05 
  LOG(ER) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 1.62635 0.20122 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(ER)   2.66683 0.07384 
  LOG(GB) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.09822 0.90652 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(GB)   4.31375 0.01565 
  LOG(GT) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 1.86593 0.15949 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(GT)   3.88202 0.02341 
  LOG(M) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.9791 0.37881 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(M)   3.34022 0.03896 
  LOG(MB) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.19093 0.82645 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(MB)   8.65678 0.00032 
  LOG(MN) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 3.78117 0.02573 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(MN)   1.35313 0.26258 
  LOG(NEQ) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 2.45752 0.09021 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(NEQ)   4.90514 0.00906 
  LOG(NFA) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.67192 0.51276 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(NFA)   2.49466 0.08706 
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 Table 4. Pairwise Granger Causality Tests with Two Lags 
Causality between Bank Credit (i.e. Lending) and Other Individual Variables 
Sample Period: 2008:01 to 2017:12 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs. F-Statistic Probability 
  LOG(-NX) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 1.59584 0.20727 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(-NX)   0.50661 0.6039 
  LOG(P) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 2.43955 0.09178 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(P)   10.1725 8.70E-05 
  LOG(R) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 3.14515 0.04685 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(R)   7.79696 0.00067 
  LOG(RN) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 5.56616 0.00495 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(RN)   0.46623 0.62857 
  LOG(RR) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 2.68371 0.07266 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(RR)   2.78774 0.0658 
  LOG(SR) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.10815 0.89759 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(SR)   6.8031 0.00162 
  LOG(TDR) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 5.3052 0.00628 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(TDR)   1.95147 0.14682 
  LOG(V) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 4.42431 0.01413 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(V)   0.91804 0.40226 
  LOG(X) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.41621 0.66055 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(X)   4.65392 0.01142 
  LOG(Y) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.3758 0.6876 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(Y)   19.8691 4.00E-08 
  LOG(MB-CC) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 0.81215 0.44647 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(MB-CC)   14.3521 2.80E-06 
  LOG(CR/MN) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 3.78117 0.02573 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR/MN)   1.12204 0.32922 
  LOG(BD/MN) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 1.17839 0.31153 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(BD/MN)   2.46498 0.08957 
  LOG(MN/MB) does not Granger Cause LOG(CR) 118 2.92599 0.05769 
  LOG(CR) does not Granger Cause LOG(MN/MB)   1.71886 0.18392 
Source: Computations performed by Eviews, Date: 12/31/18   Time: 15:16 
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Appendix 3. Regression Equations of Empirical Results  
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: bank deposits (𝐵𝑑), velocity of 






























  (A1) 
         𝑡     −6.29       20.94          26.43 
     𝑅2 =  0.997 𝐷𝑊 = 2.05     𝐹 = 17657    𝐻𝑇 = 0.117   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in monetary base (𝑀𝑏) on growth in: bank credit (𝐶𝑟) and bank 
deposits (𝐵𝑑).  
 





















   (A2) 
          𝑡    37.43     −3.22    
     𝑅2 = 0.999998 𝐷𝑊 = 2.02     𝐹 = 5.5 × 107    𝐻𝑇 = 0.0000   SP: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in monetary base (𝑀𝑏) on growth in: bank credit (𝐶𝑟) and bank 
deposits in the previous month (𝐵𝑑(−1)).  
 





















   (A3) 
          𝑡    31.46      8.37    
     𝑅2 =  0.999996 𝐷𝑊 = 2.06     𝐹 = 8.1 × 107    𝐻𝑇 = 0.0000   SP: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: investments (𝐼) and consumer 
price index (𝑃). 





















   (A4) 
          𝑡  11.50  21.94  
     𝑅2 =  0.995 𝐷𝑊 = 1.99     𝐹 = 23242    𝐻𝑇 = 0.098   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: demand for money (𝑀𝑑), CPI (𝑃) 






























  (A5) 
         𝑡     6.36      25.11    −14.21 
     𝑅2 =  0.996 𝐷𝑊 = 1.87     𝐹 = 15303    𝐻𝑇 = 0.135   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: reserves (𝑅𝑒), nominal interest 






























  (A6) 
         𝑡    −10.35     −8.19      21.48 
     𝑅2 =  0.977 𝐷𝑊 = 1.74     𝐹 = 2445    𝐻𝑇 = 0.348   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
 
Regression of growth in money supply (𝑀𝑛) on growth in: bank credit (𝐶𝑟), price in the 


























  (A7) 
              𝑡           3.84   9.43      −4.45 
     𝑅2 =  0.998 𝐷𝑊 = 1.87     𝐹 = 29062    𝐻𝑇 = 0.012   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
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   (A8) 
          𝑡    20.40      3.33   
     𝑅2 =  0.997 𝐷𝑊 = 2.02     𝐹 = 34431    𝐻𝑇 = 0.117   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: monetary base (𝑀𝑏), savings 





































   (A9) 
        𝑡    9.85     5.01     13.47      4.82 
     𝑅2 =  0.99 𝐷𝑊 = 2.05     𝐹 = 4938    𝐻𝑇 = 0.040   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟)  on growth in: money supply (𝑀𝑛),  bank 


























  (A10) 
                  𝑡            23.20          −15.25             50.34 
     𝑅2 =  0.999 𝐷𝑊 = 1.73     𝐹 = 81030    𝐻𝑇 = 0.025   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in real income (𝑌) on growth in: bank credit  (𝐶𝑟), velocity of 


























  (A11) 
          𝑡          8.35              59.08                 −115.01 
     𝑅2 =  0.999 𝐷𝑊 = 1.78     𝐹 = 86564    𝐻𝑇 = 0.097   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in price level i.e. inflation (𝑃) on growth in: bank credit (𝐶𝑟), 
velocity of money in the credit market in the previous period (𝑉𝐿𝐶(−1)), income velocity on 





















































         𝑡         44.79              10.22                    4.69              
   3.21 
     𝑅2 =  0.99 𝐷𝑊 = 2.20     𝐹 = 5261    𝐻𝑇 = 0.175   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: real income (𝑌), bank deposits 












































  𝑡    8.38   −7.42     −3.69        6.22    
       3.74 
     𝑅2 =  0.98 𝐷𝑊 = 1.91     𝐹 = 1616    𝐻𝑇 = 0.067   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟)  on growth in: bank deposits (𝐵𝑑),  money 
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       𝑡        −6.40        12.37      3.05            13.98          5.37   
  −5.83 
     𝑅2 =  0.999 𝐷𝑊 = 2.08     𝐹 = 16444    𝐻𝑇 = 0.087   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of inflation (𝑃) on growth in: bank credit (𝐶𝑟), velocity of money in the credit 





















































         𝑡         43.39           11.03                  8.39              
  2.74 
     𝑅2 =  0.99 𝐷𝑊 = 2.20     𝐹 = 5140    𝐻𝑇 = 0.196   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: real interest rate (𝑅), price level 












































       𝑡    −3.87     11.04      3.09        9.43    
    −3.19 
     𝑅2 =  0.997 𝐷𝑊 = 1.80     𝐹 = 8176    𝐻𝑇 = 0.2210   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: government bonds (𝐺𝑏), money 
supply (𝑀𝑛), real income (𝑌), time deposit rate (𝑇𝐷𝑅), domestic credit rate (𝐷𝐶), claims on 











































  (A17) 
       𝑡          24.52      12.20 −3.89           7.04       5.53   6.04 
     𝑅2 =  0.999 𝐷𝑊 = 1.93     𝐹 = 3314    𝐻𝑇 = 0.555   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 































  (A18) 
         𝑡  15.31    4.53       −2.95 
     𝑅2 =  0.93 𝐷𝑊 = 1.74     𝐹 = 804    𝐻𝑇 = 0.105   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: real income (𝑌), real interest rate 
(𝑅), CPI i.e. price level in the previous period 𝑃(−1)), income velocity of money in the 












































      𝑡   11.22  −5.19       11.84         −4.07            −5.10 
     𝑅2 =  0.98 𝐷𝑊 = 1.89     𝐹 = 1649    𝐻𝑇 = 0.145   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: savings ratio (Sr), money supply 
(𝑀𝑛),  demand deposits ratio (𝐷𝐷𝑅), bank deposits (𝐵𝑑), exchange rate (𝐸𝑅), CPI i.e. price 
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2)), Sample Period: 2008:03 to 2017:12 
   
Variable   Coefficient t–Statistic    
 (A20) 
d(log(Sr/Y))/d(d(𝐶𝑟
2))      0.051      5.11  
d(log(Mn/Y))/d(d(𝐶𝑟
2))      0.676    12.36  
d(log(DDR/Y))/d(d(𝐶𝑟
2))    -0.030    -5.13  
d(log(Bd/Y))/d(d(𝐶𝑟
2))     -0.204    -5.31  
d(log(ER/Y))/d(d(𝐶𝑟
2))      0.309      6.75  
d(log(P(-1)/Y))/d(d(𝐶𝑟
2))     1.040      6.21  
d(log(TDR/Y))/d(d(𝐶𝑟
2))    -0.044    -3.65  
d(log(R/Y))/d(d(𝐶𝑟
2))     -0.028    -3.39  
     𝑅2 =  0.997 𝐷𝑊 = 2.05     𝐹 = 4967    𝐻𝑇 = 0.027   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
  
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: bank deposits (𝐵𝑑), consumer 































  (A21) 
         𝑡       11.42      24.63     −4.04 
     𝑅2 =  0.996 𝐷𝑊 = 2.05     𝐹 = 13609    𝐻𝑇 = 0.075   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: bank deposits (𝐵𝑑), net equity 





































  (A22) 
        𝑡     −9.10        4.66         21.44          − 3.18 
     𝑅2 =  0.99 𝐷𝑊 = 2.08     𝐹 = 2739    𝐻𝑇 = 0.075   Sample Period: 2008:05-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: money supply (𝑀𝑛), consumer 





































   (A23) 
        𝑡   14.18    24.61     −3.32    −4.44 
     𝑅2 =  0.997 𝐷𝑊 = 1.93     𝐹 = 12047    𝐻𝑇 = 0.097   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: government bonds (𝐺𝑏), money 
supply (𝑀𝑛), real income (𝑌), Treasury bonds (𝑇𝑅), domestic credit rate (𝐷𝐶),  claims on 












































       𝑡            7.17         12.83      −4.67  −6.99            −6.27          3. 75 
     𝑅2 =  0.98 𝐷𝑊 = 1.94     𝐹 = 990    𝐻𝑇 = 0.132   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: money supply (𝑀𝑛), rediscount 





































   (A25) 
        𝑡    8.15   −3.86      12.10      3.52 
     𝑅2 =  0.996 𝐷𝑊 = 1.93     𝐹 = 8528    𝐻𝑇 = 0.119   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
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Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: Treasury bonds (𝐺𝑇), nominal 
exchange rate (𝐸𝑅), interbank rate (𝐼𝑅), claims on government (𝐶𝐺), savings ratio (𝑆𝑟) and 











































  (A26) 
       𝑡          3.65      8. 38  −6.73           7.04       7.65  6.45 
     𝑅2 =  0.995 𝐷𝑊 = 1.84     𝐹 = 4099    𝐻𝑇 = 0.041   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: monetary base in the previous 






























  (A27) 
         𝑡      4.22            8.89            −7.65 
     𝑅2 =  0.96 𝐷𝑊 = 1.81     𝐹 = 1483    𝐻𝑇 = 0.297   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: real GDP in the previous period 
(𝑌(−1)), domestic price level (𝑃), real interest rate (𝑅), bank deposits (𝐵𝑑), time deposits 











































  (A28) 
       𝑡          7.17      12. 83   −4.67            −6.99         − 6.27        3.75 
     𝑅2 =  0.98 𝐷𝑊 = 1.94     𝐹 = 990    𝐻𝑇 = 0.132   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in real income (𝑌) on growth in: velocity of money (𝑉) and real 
interest rate (𝑅). 
 































  (A29) 
            𝑡         12.07            −3.82             
     𝑅2 =  0.93 𝐷𝑊 = 1.77     𝐹 = 1579    𝐻𝑇 = 0.0000   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in demand for net equity  (𝑁𝐸𝑄/𝑃) on growth in: bank deposits 


























  (A30) 
         𝑡         −8.01          95.51           7.57 
     𝑅2 =  0.96 𝐷𝑊 = 1.73     𝐹 = 4584    𝐻𝑇 = 0.644   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in price level i.e. inflation (𝑃) on growth in: bank credit (𝐶𝑟), 





















































         𝑡        27.58          −7.66                  8.41                5.50 
     𝑅2 =  0.99 𝐷𝑊 = 2.06     𝐹 = 3756    𝐻𝑇 = 0.680   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in real interest rate (𝑅)  on growth in: money supply in the 



























   (A32) 
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        𝑡               −5.92             5.06      7.41            9.73 
     𝑅2 =  0.90 𝐷𝑊 = 1.90     𝐹 = 346    𝐻𝑇 = 0.133   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in demand for government bonds (𝐺𝑏/𝑃) on growth in: demand 
for bank credit in the previous month (𝐶𝑟(−1)/𝑃(−1)), demand for bank deposits in the 
previous month (𝐵𝑑(−1)/𝑃(−1)), net growth in demand for equity (𝑁𝐸𝑄/𝑃), real interest 





















































        𝑡       3.88            −5.86               6.14             11.81      
     −10.52 
     𝑅2 =  0.96 𝐷𝑊 = 1.85     𝐹 = 668    𝐻𝑇 = 0.085   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in nominal exchange rate (𝐸𝑅) on growth in: savings ratio (𝑆𝑟),, 
money supply in the previous month (𝑀𝑛(−1)),  real interest rate (𝑅), net equity (𝑁𝐸𝑄), 
prices (𝑃), government bonds 𝐺𝑏, exports in the previous month (𝑋) and imports in the 
previous month (𝑀). 
 
Dependent Variable: 𝑑(log (𝐸𝑅/𝐷𝑡))/𝑑(𝑑(𝐸𝑅2)) 
Sample Period: 2008:03 to 2017:12    
Variable    Coefficient t–Statistic  (A34) 
𝑑(log (𝑀𝑛(−1)/𝐷𝑡))/𝑑(𝑑(𝐸𝑅2))     0.141      5.23 
𝑑(log (𝑅/𝐷𝑡))/𝑑(𝑑(𝐸𝑅2))      0.025      8.05  
𝑑(log (𝑁𝐸𝑄/𝐷𝑡))/𝑑(𝑑(𝐸𝑅2))      0.185      9.58  
𝑑(log (𝑃/𝐷𝑡))/𝑑(𝑑(𝐸𝑅2))        0.836    14.35  
𝑑(log (𝐺𝑏/𝐷𝑡))/𝑑(𝑑(𝐸𝑅2))   −0.075 −7.60 
𝑑(log (𝑋(−1)/𝐷𝑡))/𝑑(𝑑(𝐸𝑅2))  −0.079           −13.30 
𝑑(log (𝑀(−1)/𝐷𝑡))/𝑑(𝑑(𝐸𝑅2))     0.053    4.71  
     𝑅2 =  0.997 𝐷𝑊 = 1.94     𝐹 = 1688    𝐻𝑇 = 0.104   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in real interest rate (𝑅)  on growth in: money supply in the 
previous month (𝑀(−1)), government bonds (𝐺𝑏), total deposits in the banking system (𝐷𝑡) 
































  (A35) 
        𝑡        −11.52             8.08              5.60           
   − 7.82 
     𝑅2 =  0.91 𝐷𝑊 = 1.81     𝐹 = 404    𝐻𝑇 = 0.576   Sample Period: 2008:05-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in money supply (𝑀𝑛)  on growth in: bank credit (𝐶𝑟),  bank 


























  (A36) 
              𝑡           10.41         4.23                 2.69 
     𝑅2 =  0.997 𝐷𝑊 = 1.95     𝐹 = 18142    𝐻𝑇 = 0.082   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth bank credit (𝐶𝑟) on growth in: savings ratio (𝑆𝑟), money supply 
(𝑀𝑛),  demand deposits ratio (𝐷𝐷𝑅),  bank deposits (𝐵𝑑),  nominal exchange rate (𝐸𝑅), 
consumer price index (𝑃), time deposits rate (𝑇𝐷𝑅) and total deposits in the banking system 
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Sample Period: 2008:03 to 2017:12    
Variable   Coefficient  t–Statistic  (A37) 
𝑑(𝑆𝑟/𝑌)/𝑑(𝑑(𝐶𝑟
2))      7.70 × 1010         4.55 
𝑑(𝑀𝑛/𝑌)/𝑑(𝑑(𝐶𝑟
2))    0.317        9.75  
𝑑(𝐷𝐷𝑅/𝑌)/𝑑(𝑑(𝐶𝑟
2))             −6.70 × 1010   −3.90             
𝑑(𝐵𝑑/𝑌)/𝑑(𝑑(𝐶𝑟
2))               −0.216    −2.92             
𝑑(𝐸𝑅/𝑌)/𝑑(𝑑(𝐶𝑟
2))    3.51 × 108      4.11 
𝑑(𝑃/𝑌)/𝑑(𝑑(𝐶𝑟
2))    2.00 × 1010                  9.04 
𝑑(𝑇𝐷𝑅/𝑌)/𝑑(𝑑(𝐶𝑟
2))             −1.70 × 1010              −4.52 
𝑑(𝐷𝑡(−1)/𝑌)/𝑑(𝑑(𝐶𝑟
2))   0.171                              4.19 
     𝑅2 =  0.999  𝐷𝑊 = 2.01    𝐹 = 13230    𝐻𝑇 = 0.070   Sample Period: 2008:03-2017:12  
 
Regression of growth in net exports (𝑁𝑋) on growth in: real interest rate in the previous 
month (𝑅(−1)), real income in the previous month (𝑌(−1)), bank deposits in the previous 






























   (A38) 
       𝑡              6.62         −13.58       34.44  −6.03           8.28 
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